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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research project is to determine whether the implicit theory of
integrity, a theory from the social psychology literature that predicts how social
judgments and decisions are made, can explain internal auditors’ decisions. The implicit
theory (Dweck and Leggett 1988) states that there are two types of people: (1) entity
theorists and (2) incremental theorists. Entity theorists form strong inferences from
observed behavior that are used to predict future behavior. Incremental theorists, on the
other hand, do not infer characteristics from behavior, and therefore, do not attempt to
predict future behavior. In an internal auditing context, the implicit theory is applicable to
an internal auditor’s assessment of management’s integrity. A quasi-experiment was used
to assess the main effect of integrity cues (three levels of integrity between subjects) on
an internal auditors’ assessed risk of management fraud based on a hypothetical case. The
auditors’ implicit theory of integrity (interacted with the integrity cue) is also
investigated. These tests offer some evidence in support of the main effect of the integrity
cue on the fraud risk assessment, but no evidence is found in support of the interaction
effect of the implicit theory.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the research project is to determine whether a personal conviction
of an internal auditor, specifically his/her implicit theory of integrity, can explain
differences between judgments and decisions of internal auditors. “Judgments and
decisions are made under uncertainty about the relationship between cues and events”
(Libby 1981, 4). The implicit theory (Dweck and Leggett 1988) is a theory from the
social psychology literature that describes why different people (i.e., observers) construe
different relationships between observed cues and events related to the behavior of those
observed. The implicit theory states that there are two types of people categorized by how
an individual’s underlying beliefs influence judgments: (1) entity theorists and (2)
incremental theorists.
When considering a specific personal characteristic (e.g., intelligence, morality),
entity theorists form strong inferences from observed behavior that is used to predict
future behavior. An entity theorist believes the specific personal characteristic varies
between people, but within a given person remains constant. For example, John holds an
entity theory of integrity; that is, he believes that while one person may exhibit more or
less integrity than another, an individual’s integrity is constant and does not change over
time. Therefore, if John observes someone exhibiting low integrity, John will believe that
person to be of low integrity, and will use that belief to predict that the person will act
similarly in the future.
When considering the same personal characteristic, an incremental theorist does
not form inferences and, therefore, will not make predictions about future behavior. An
incremental theorist believes that the specific personal characteristic varies both between
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people and within people. Using the same example, Jane holds an incremental theory of
integrity; that is, she believes that the level of integrity displayed in a person’s actions is
malleable and may change. Therefore, if Jane observes the same behavior observed by
John, Jane will not form a belief about integrity of the observed person and will not
attempt to predict how that person will act in the future.
Several hypotheses have been tested by researchers to determine how this implicit
theory affects the judgments and decisions of people. McConnell (2001) studies how
people form social impressions (like or dislike) based on observed behavior of people.
McConnell’s conclusion is that entity theorists weight the cues they receive earlier more
heavily than those received later, but incremental theorists do not. Therefore, entity
theorists formed social impressions based on early observations. Gervey, Chiu, Hong,
and Dweck (1999) investigated the impact of character-related traits on decision making
as a function of implicit theory when determining guilt or innocence of a murder suspect.
Entity theorists were more likely to use cues about the defendant’s respectability in
determining guilt or innocence. When respectability was low (high), a higher (lower)
percentage of entity theorists concluded guilt than when respectability was high (low);
incremental theorists were equally likely to conclude guilt regardless of respectability.
While McConnell (2001) demonstrated that the implicit theory has an impact on
the social judgments people form, Gervey et al. (1999) offers evidence that people will
use those judgment in a decision. In an internal auditing context, it is a common practice
to assess the integrity of clients. That assessment is a potential factor in judgments and
decisions about the strength of the control environment, the system of internal controls,
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and the risk of errors and fraud. This project is concerned with internal auditors’
judgments of fraud risk.
Cressey (1953) developed the fraud triangle (see Figure 1), which indicates that
three elements (motive, perceived opportunity, and a propensity to rationalize) must be
present for fraud to occur. Motive and opportunities are characteristics of the
environment, which have been studied by many researchers. For example, Apostolou,
Hassell, and Webber (2000) used professionals to classify risk factors as to motive or
opportunity. Also, Church, McMillan, and Schneider (1998, 2001a, 2001b) conducted a
between-subjects experiment to determine whether the presence of fraud risk factors
affected internal auditors’ consideration of fraudulent financial reporting.
However, only two fraud studies have investigated the third point of Cressey’s
(1953) triangle, the propensity to rationalize, which is a characteristic of the
perpetrator(s) of fraud. According to Cressey (1950), the propensity to rationalize is a
moral weakness and a hidden variable. Though hidden, auditors do make an assessment
of this hidden variable when assessing the integrity of management (AICPA 1996, 2002).
Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham (1989) asked auditors with fraud experience to
classify fraud indicators as to their ability to identify opportunity, motive, and attitude (of
the perpetrator) to commit fraud. Beaulieu (2001) investigated the effect of
management’s integrity on audit risk, procedures, and fees.
The first question this research project addresses is whether auditors will use (i.e.,
give weight to) integrity cues in their assessment of management fraud risk (a main
effect). Solomon and Shields (1995) examine twenty years of research in auditing
judgment and decision-making processes, and they identified 21 studies that employ cue
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Perceived Opportunity
To Commit Fraud

Situation Pressure
(Motivation)

Personal Integrity
(Propensity to Rationalize)

Adapted from Cressey (1953)

Figure 1. The fraud triangle
usage as a research method for policy capturing. These studies generally found the cues
significant in their research model, and the cues were “found to be consistent with
professional auditing standards” (Solomon and Shield 1995, 152). As of December
2002, a new Statement on Auditing Standard related to considering fraud in an audit
guides the auditor to “identify events or conditions that indicate incentives/pressures to
perpetrate fraud, opportunities to carry out the fraud, or attitudes/rationalizations to
justify a fraudulent action” (AICPA 2002, ¶31). These three distinguished categories
correspond to the Cressey’s (1953) fraud triangle (see Figure 1) and are listed in the
standard’s appendix which contains examples of risk factors separated into the same three
categories. Following the guidance of this standard, auditors should be seeking and
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giving weight to information about “inappropriate values or ethical standards” (AICPA
2002, ¶A.2) of their clients.
In addition to the main effect of the integrity cue on the auditors’ assessment of
fraud risk, this study will also investigate whether the weight given to those cues is
modulated by the implicit theory of integrity held by the auditor (an interaction effect).
The implicit theory literature (e.g., McConnell 2001 and Gervey et al. 1999) suggests that
the implicit theory has such an effect on social judgments and that those judgments have
been used to affect decisions. The implicit theory is being added to this research model to
determine if it holds in an auditing setting.
As suggested by Gervey et al. (1999), the implicit theory also has an effect on the
types of additional information requested, with entity theorists requesting more personal
information (i.e., a further investigation of the cues received) than incremental theorists
request. This study investigates whether the auditors’ implicit theory of integrity affects
the type of additional information sought by the auditor during the planning process of
the audit.
To investigate these research questions, a quasi-experiment was conducted. The
research instrument (which is described in detail in Chapter 3) contains three main
sections: (1) assessment of the subjects’ implicit theory of integrity using methods from
prior research (e.g., McConnell 2001, Gervey et al. 1999), (2) presentation of a
hypothetical narrative case followed by some audit planning tasks, and (3) collection of
the subjects’ demographic information. The narrative case, in the form of an audit
planning memorandum, presents the three elements of Cressey’s (1953) triangle: a
motive to commit fraud, an opportunity to commit fraud, and a cue about the integrity of
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the client. While the motive and opportunity are not manipulated in this case, there is a
three-level manipulation of the integrity cue with only one level presented to each
subject.
After reading the narrative, the subjects, internal auditors, were asked to make
judgments about the likelihood of possible causes for a change in an analytic described in
the case narrative. In this between-subjects design, the main effect of the integrity cue
was investigated. Some evidence was found in support of client integrity affecting the
auditors’ assessment of management fraud risk.
In addition, each auditor’s implicit theory of integrity was included as an
interaction variable to determine whether it has a moderating effect on the auditor’s
assessed risk of fraud, but no evidence was found to support such an effect. The implicit
theory of integrity was also not found to have an affect on the types of additional
information requested by the subjects. The findings of this study are in contrast to the
evidence in support of an effect of the implicit theory on decisions in other literature
(e.g., Gervey et al. 1999).
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following chapters. Chapter 2 is a
review of literature related to the implicit theory and management fraud. Chapter 3
describes the development of the research hypotheses tested and the development of the
research instrument used to collect data. The tests of the hypotheses are described in
Chapter 4, while the research conclusions and limitations are presented in Chapter 5.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
This research project investigates how internal auditors use cues about the
integrity of management in their assessment of the risk of management fraud. In addition,
this study is designed to determine whether that assessment is affected by the internal
auditors’ implicit theory of integrity (an interaction with the integrity cue). In this
chapter, literature related to the implicit theory and auditor assessment of fraud is
reviewed.
2.1. The Implicit Theory
Dweck and Leggett (1988) developed a generalizable implicit theory model that
accounts for behavior patterns and the underlying motivations and goals of those
behaviors. This model development began by examining behavior in children faced with
learning (a task that improves knowledge) and performance (a task that proves existing
knowledge). All children, when faced with a learning goal, showed persistence even
when challenged. When faced with performance goals, children with low perceived selfintelligence avoided challenge and sought tasks at their comfort level; children with high
perceived self-intelligence persisted with challenges.
When given the opportunity to select a task (learning or performance), children
who believed that their intelligence was fixed (whether high or low) sought performance
tasks, while children who believed they had a potential to increase their intelligence
sought learning goals. As a result, Dweck and Leggett (1988) developed a specific model,
the implicit theory of [self] intelligence, which states that people can be categorized into
two groups with respect to beliefs about self-intelligence: (1) entity theorists who believe
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their intelligence is fixed and seek only to prove what they already know; and (2)
incremental theorists who believe their intelligence is malleable and seek to improve it.
In the second part of their paper, Dweck and Leggett (1988) modified the implicit
theory model to generalize it beyond self-intelligence and beyond the self entirely. The
general implicit theory model defines the same two types of people: (1) entity theorists
and (2) incremental theorists. Entity theorists look at a personal characteristic (e.g.,
intelligence, morality) and believe the trait is fixed in people; that is, different people may
have different levels (e.g., high morality, low morality), but within a specific person, the
level does not change over time. Because of that belief, entity theorists form impressions
about people based on observed behavior and will predict future behavior to be similar; in
general, entity theorists adapt judgment goals characterized as being evaluative, rigid, and
difficult to change.
Incremental theorists look at the same personal characteristic and believe it to be
malleable within each person. Therefore, incremental theorists do not judge or predict
future behavior; instead they adapt development goals characterized by empathy and
persistence toward change. Dweck and Leggett (1988) state that whether a person is an
entity or incremental theorist depends on the personal characteristic under consideration.
For example, a person may be an entity theorist of morality, believing a person will act
with the same observed level of morality in the future, but also be an incremental theorist
of intelligence, believing people have the capacity to improve their intelligence.
This generalized theory has been employed by researchers in different contexts,
many of which have used the theory to explain how one person perceives another. It is in
this context that the implicit theory is applicable to internal auditing because a key
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function of evaluating a system of internal controls is assessing the integrity of
management. Two studies that test how the implicit theory affects perceptions of others
are discussed below.
McConnell (2001) performed an experiment to investigate the relationship
between the implicit theory and social judgments. The implicit theory of 50
undergraduate psychology students was determined by asking their level of agreement
with three statements about a person’s likelihood to change. Next, the subjects were
presented with 36 observed behaviors (24 for a fictional person, Jim, and 12 for a
fictional person, Bob; one-third of the behaviors were undesirable for each), the subjects
(1) recalled as many behaviors of Jim and Bob as they could, (2) recalled the proportion
of undesirable behavior given about each Jim and Bob, and (3) assessed the likeability of
Jim and Bob. Entity theorists in this study were more likely than incremental theorists to
recall more behaviors in general and more from the beginning of the list (on which their
impressions were theoretically formed) than the end. Incremental theorist evaluated Jim
more favorably because of the increased frequency of the statements about him as
evidenced by assessing Jim as more likeable and attributing a greater proportion of
undesirable behaviors to Bob. McConnell’s study shows that entity theorists weight the
cues they receive earlier more heavily than those received later, but incremental theorists
do not. However, in this research project, only one cue was given, not a series as in
McConnell.
Gervey, Chiu, Hong, and Dweck (1999) investigated the impact of characterrelated traits on decision making as a function of implicit theory in a legal setting. The
transcript from a fictitious murder trial was given to 268 subjects (undergraduate
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students) in three similar studies, who were asked to decide on a verdict of guilt or
innocence of the defendant. Two experimental variables were manipulated in the
transcript: (1) defendant’s respectability as indicated by clothing and reading preferences
and (2) strength of the evidence against the defendant as indicated by the corroborating
testimony (or lack thereof) by two prosecution witnesses. In the analysis, entity theorists1
were more likely to use the defendant’s respectability in determining guilt or innocence.
That is, when respectability was low (high), a higher (lower) percentage of entity
theorists concluded guilt than when respectability was high (low); incremental theorists
were equally likely to conclude guilt regardless of respectability. Gervey et al. concluded
that "the implicit theories of moral character can set up a framework for making decisions
about others” (Gervey et al. 1999, 27). The findings of Gervey et al. (1999) demonstrate
how subjects react differently to one cue about respectability based on their implicit
theory.
McConnell (2001) demonstrated that the implicit theory has an impact on the
social judgments people form, and Gervey et al. (1999) offers evidence that people will
use those judgment in a decision. Applying the implicit theory to an internal auditor’s
assessment of management’s integrity may explain how internal auditors make very
different judgments about managements’ propensity to rationalize fraud and,
consequently, the auditor’s assessment of management fraud risk.
2.2. Fraud Literature
Cressey (1953) developed the fraud triangle (see Figure 1), which indicates that
three elements (motive, perceived opportunity, and a propensity to rationalize) must be
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present for fraud to occur. Therefore, the risk that fraud is present is a function of the
three elements:
Actual
=
Fraud Risk

f motive +


percieved propensity to 
+
.
opportunity rationalize 

(1)

Motive and opportunities are characteristics of the environment while the propensity to
rationalize is a characteristic of the perpetrator(s) of fraud. According to Cressey (1950),
the propensity to rationalize is a moral weakness and a hidden variable. Though hidden,
auditors do make an assessment of this hidden variable when assessing the integrity of
management (AICPA 1996, 2002). A presentation of accounting literature related to
auditing and fraud is presented below.
2.2.1. Professional Standards Related to Management Fraud
Fraudulent financial reporting has been the concern of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and professional accounting organizations since the mid1980s. As a result, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO)2 was formed to
sponsor The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, or the Treadway
Commission (named after its chairman). In October 1987, the Treadway Commission
issued a Report (Treadway 1987) describing its extensive review of actual fraud cases. In
its Report, the Commission noted that management fraud usually occurs when an
incentive and an opportunity coexist. To detect management fraud, an auditor must be
aware of the influence of these incentives and opportunities. The Report also includes a
nonexhaustive list of fraud risk factors (each classified as an incentive or opportunity)
that can alert an auditor that fraud may exist.
Shortly after the formation of COSO, the IIA produced Statement on Internal
Auditing Standards (SIAS) No. 3, entitled Deterrence, Detection, Investigation, and
11

Reporting of Fraud (IIA 1985). SIAS No. 3 addresses the necessary ability of internal
auditors to detect indicators of fraud when present. When such indicators are identified,
the Standard guides the internal auditor to perform additional audit procedures and to
report findings of fraud to the appropriate level of management.
In response to the Treadway Commission Report, the AICPA issued SAS No. 53,
entitled The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities
(AICPA 1988a). SAS No. 53 specified that "[t]he auditor should assess the risk that
errors and irregularities may cause the financial statement to contain a material
misstatement. Based on that assessment, the auditor should design the audit to provide
reasonable assurance of detecting errors and irregularities that are material to the
financial statements" (AICPA 1988a, ¶.05). Prior to SAS No. 53, detection of
irregularities (now known as fraud3) was not differentiated from detection of any material
error. Implementation of SAS No. 53 did not change the auditor's responsibility with
respect to detecting material irregularities; however, the auditor became responsible for
assessing the risk of material errors and irregularities, considering specific risk factors
listed in the Statement, and preparing an audit plan accordingly.
In December 1997, SAS No. 82, entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit (AICPA 1997), was issued to supersede SAS No. 53 (AICPA 1988a) by
clarifying the auditor’s detection and reporting responsibility by requiring that the auditor
make a separate assessment of the possibility of fraud. When considering management
fraud,4 SAS No. 82 requires auditors to consider 25 risk factors included in the text of the
standard.

12

In December 2002, a new Statement on Auditing Standard, numbered 99, was
issued. The new statement, entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement
Audit (AICPA 2002), supersedes SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997). The new standard increases
the auditor’s responsibility with regard to fraud audit procedures including extensive
documentation of the audit team’s discussions of fraud, identified fraud risks, fraudrelated audit procedures and results, and communications about fraud and risks with the
client and others. Notably, the new standard directs the auditor to “identify events or
conditions that indicate incentives/pressures to perpetrate fraud, opportunities to carry out
the fraud, or attitudes/rationalizations to justify a fraudulent action” (AICPA 2002, ¶31).
These three distinguished categories correspond to the Cressey’s (1953) fraud triangle
(see Figure 1). Additionally, an appendix to the new standard contains examples of risk
factors separated into the same three categories. In that appendix, the standard offers the
following guidance to the auditor in identifying risk factors related to
attitudes/rationalizations in management fraud risk:
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members,
management, or employees, that allow them to engage in and/or justify
fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to observation by
the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence
of such information should consider it in identifying the risks of material
misstatement arising from fraudulent financial reporting (AICPA 2002,
¶A.2).
Among those risk factor examples identified, “communication of inappropriate values or
ethical standards” (AICPA 2002, ¶A.2) is listed. SAS No. 99 is guiding auditors to look
at evidence of the values of the client, which is the subject of this research project.
2.2.2. Academic Research Related to Management Fraud
Auditors make an assessment or judgment about the likelihood of management
fraud. Academic research related to the judgment or decision-making process has been
13

conducted in many disciplines including studies about the judgment of auditors in a
management fraud setting. This section contains a review of these studies organized by
the decision-making framework provided by Libby and Lewis (1977).
Libby and Lewis (1997) describe decision making as a system of inputs (how
information gets to the decision maker), processes (how the decision maker forms a
judgment using personal characteristics and decision rules), and outputs (the quality of
the judgment and the self-insight of the decision maker). Assuming the inputs would be
the same for any auditor in a specific fraud assessment task, it is the process that is of
importance when considering what leads to auditors making different assessments.
According to Libby and Lewis, the process is influenced by two main factors: (1) the
decision rule, the objective method used by the decision maker to complete the decision
process, and (2) personal characteristics of the decision maker.
2.2.2.1. Process Decision Rules and Inputs
In accounting research, particularly in research related to management fraud,
studies have concentrated on cue usage in a linear form (regression) to determine the
significance and weight of manipulated experimental variables, most of which are inputs
(i.e., different circumstances). These experiments manipulate objective variables between
subjects so the researchers can make a determination of how auditors’ decisions differ
when circumstances are different.
Since SAS No. 53 (AICPA 1988a) and SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997) were
implemented, academic researchers have been examining the use and effectiveness of the
fraud risk factors. Nieschwietz, Schultz, and Zimbelman (2000) give an extensive review
of the body of fraud literature between 1981 and 2000. The review consists of over 30
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fraud studies that investigated the validity and weighting of predictors of fraud, auditors’
unaided and mechanically aided fraud risk assessments, and how fraud detection
influences audit plans. A general consensus of many of the studies in this review is that
models (e.g., logit, expert system) developed in fraud research have outperformed the
unaided auditor in detecting fraud,5 suggesting that audit firms should consider a
modeling approach to fraud assessment. Nieschwietz, Schultz, and Zimbleman suggest
that the outperformance can be attributed to the complexity of the risk assessment task
because “humans have difficulty achieving high accuracy when making complex
decisions” (Nieschwietz, Schultz, and Zimbelman 2000, 238).
Zimbleman (1997) examines the SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997) requirement for
auditors to separately assess management fraud risk and how it affects auditors’ attention
to risk factors, planned audit hours, and types of audit tests planned. Two versions of a
case were prepared with financial statements and narratives that presented either high- or
low-risk fraud risk factors. Using software, the 108 subjects were shown one version of
the narrative and were asked to do one of the following: (1) make one holistic assessment
of risk; (2) make a separate assessment of risk of error, then risk of fraud; or (3) make a
separate assessment of risk of fraud, then risk of error. Zimbleman found that auditors
who had to make separate fraud- and error- risk assessments spent more time reading the
fraud risk factors (cues) and budgeted more hours for both the high- and low-risk cases
(i.e., there was no in hours difference between the high- and low-risk cases). Also, no
effect was found regarding the type of audit tests planned.
Glover, Prawitt, Schultz, and Zimbleman (2003), a study conducted after SAS No.
82 (AICPA 1997) was issued and implemented, replicated Zimbleman (1997), which was
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conducted prior to the issuance of SAS No. 82, to determine if Zimbleman captured the
full effect of the issuance of SAS No. 82. By comparing the pre-82 responses to the post82 responses, Glover et al. found that auditors with the high-risk case were more likely to
increase the extent of audit tests than those with the low-risk case. Again, there was no
evidence that auditors modify the type of the planned tests. Zimbleman demonstrates that
as professional standards have become more directive about the specific responsibilities
of auditors related to the investigation of fraud, auditors pay more attention to the cues
that would point to fraud. Glover et al. further shows that the increased requirements and
auditor attention have led to a change in how the audits are planned.
Apostolou, Hassell, Webber, and Sumners (2001) conducted a study that
examined the decision rule or cue weighting used by auditors to evaluate the 25 risk
factors identified in SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997). A survey, which was sent to 140
auditors (internal and external), consisted of 52 pairwise comparisons between the risk
factors. The respondents rated one factor more important than the other or of equal
importance. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was used to calculate a weight for
each of the 25 factors revealing that the six factors categorized by SAS No. 82 as
management characteristics accounted for 58.2% of the importance while industry
conditions accounted for 14.4%, and operating and financial stability characteristics
accounted for 27.4%.
There is no guidance in SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997) as to whether the presented
risk factors indicate motive, opportunity, and/or rationalization. To provide this guidance,
Apostolou, Hassell, and Webber (2000) surveyed 35 auditors thought to be experts in
financial statement fraud because of their experience. The subjects, who were provided
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by four of the Big 5 accounting firms in conjunction with support from the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, were given the 25 factors in random order and
were asked to classify the factors as motive or opportunity (or unsure). They were not
asked to classify a factor as rationalization because rationalization is a measure of the
ethics of a person committing fraud according to Apostolou, Hassell, and Webber. The
result of the survey was a classification of 13 risk factors as motivation, 11 as
opportunity, with one not receiving a majority. Nineteen of the classifications were
significant in a chi-square tests. All of the industry condition factors were classified as
motive; all but one of the management characteristics factors was classified as
opportunity. The operating and financial stability characteristics were split. The only
factor receiving a unanimous classification was significant compensation tied to
aggressive accounting practices, which was classified as a motivating factor.
Bedard and Graham (2002) investigated whether the orientation (positive or
negative) of decision aids used during an audit has an effect on how the auditors assess
risk and plan the audit. There were 46 auditors participating in this study, making 23
pairs of auditors. Each pair came from the same firm and had worked on the same
engagement. Each auditor was given an audit planning task on a client with which they
were familiar, and pairs planned for the same client. Within each pair, one auditor
received a negatively-worded decision aid (e.g., “function reveals a number of
weaknesses” (Bedard and Graham 2002, 45)), and one received a positively-worded
decision aid (e.g., “function is appropriately organized” (Bedard and Graham 2002, 45)).
Using regression analysis, Bedard and Graham found that when using a negative decision
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aid, auditors identified more risk factors and that the planning of substantive tests is more
directly tied to the risks identified.
Church, McMillan, and Schneider (1998) study the effects of inherent risk,
control risk, and decision frame (structure of the auditing task) on how an internal auditor
considers fraud. Their 2×2×2 design manipulated three variables in a hypothetical case
given to 167 internal auditors: (1) inherent risk was high or low; (2) control risk was high
or low; and (3) after a description of an unexpected increase in receivables, the auditing
task was manipulated as either to investigate whether accounts receivable was fairly
stated or materially misstated (decision frame). After reading the case, the subjects were
given a list of 18 possible explanations for the unexpected fluctuation in receivables;
three categories of explanations (six explanations each) were represented: (1) fraud, (2)
error, (3) environmental. The subjects were asked to select six explanations from the list
of 18 to investigate further in completion of their task. Analysis of the responses
indicated that whether an internal auditor chose to pursue the fraudulent explanations was
significantly affected by the levels of inherent risk and control risk, but not by decision
frame.
In a similar study, Church, McMillan, and Schneider (2001a, 2001b) conducted a
2×2×2 between-subjects experiment to determine what factors affected internal auditors’
consideration of fraudulent financial reporting. The 127 internal auditors in this
experiment were given background on a company including one of eight scenarios
involving analytical procedures, which were defined by permutations of (1) positive or
negative unexpected income, (2) presence or absence of an income-based bonus plan, and
(3) restrictive or nonrestrictive debt covenants. The respondents were asked to list up to
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six explanations for the unexpected difference in income and to categorize each
explanation as probably caused by economic factors, unintentional error, or fraud.
Church, McMillan, and Schneider found that internal auditors were more likely to
conclude (list as an explanation) fraud when unexpected income was positive; this effect
was more pronounced when debt covenants were restrictive. No association was found
regarding income-based bonuses. Church, McMillan, and Schneider also investigated
association between conclusion of fraud and experience (tenure, both as an internal and
an external auditor), but no association was found. Church, McMillan, and Schneider
(1988, 2001a, 2001b) establish that auditors are more likely to conclude fraud when cues
point toward motive and opportunity. However, these studies did not investigate the
effect of client integrity on the likelihood to conclude fraud.
Beaulieu (2001) investigated the effect of management’s integrity on the four
variables: (1) assessment of business risk, (2) assessment of combined risk, (3) extent of
audit evidence recommended, and (4) audit fees recommended. Sixty-three Canadian
audit partners read a narrative regarding a potential audit client in which integrity of
management was manipulated by including (or not including) cues such as “the executive
is not respected in the local business community” (Beaulieu 2001, 92). The response
variables were measured on an 11-point scale where 10 (zero) indicated the variable
would be much higher (lower) than that of a normal firm in the same industry. Using path
analysis, Beaulieu concluded that integrity is inversely related to business risk and
combined risk directly, and inversely related indirectly (through risk) to
recommendations for audit evidence and audit fees. The studies discussed in this section
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demonstrate examinations of inputs and/or decision rules used by auditors when making
audit decisions related to fraud.
2.2.2.2. Personal Characteristics of the Decision Maker (Auditor)
Many behavioral accounting studies have examined the personal characteristics of
decision makers. Some recent studies concerning how personal characteristics of auditors
affect audit judgments are briefly discussed. Church, McMillan, and Schneider (2001a,
2001b) investigate the association between concluding fraud and auditor experience
(tenure), both as an internal and an external auditor, but no association was found.
Beirstaker and Wright (2001) tested whether practical problem solving ability
affects how an audit task is completed. Subjects (66 auditors and 78 students) were asked
to solve two real-world problems (finding a mechanic and assessing the correctness of tax
deductions) and two auditing tasks (evaluation a system of internal controls and
performance analytical procedures). The results indicated that subjects with high practical
problem solving ability (assessed by the degree to which the problem was identified and a
complete solution described) were better able to complete the auditing tasks.
Abdolmohammadi and Owhoso (2000) investigate the effect of ethical cues and
experience on auditors’ assessment of fraud risk. The subjects (80 audit managers and 80
audit seniors) were given the research materials, which consisted of a set of accounts and
a loan receivable containing errors. Half of the subjects received materials that also
included a positive-ethics cue indicating that the company is taking risks related to the
betterment of the community’s social and economic goals. In this 2×2 research design (2
levels of experience; ethics cue or none), subjects were assigned randomly to one of the
four cells. After reading the materials, the subjects assessed the likelihood of fraud risk
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on a scale of one to 100. Using ANOVA, Abdolmohammadi and Owhoso found the
following: (1) the presence of the ethical cue significantly decreased the fraud risk
assessment by audit seniors (less experience), but not the fraud risk assessment by audit
managers (more experience), and (2) fraud risk assessment by audit seniors is
significantly lower than that of the audit manager when the ethics cue was present, but
there was no significant difference when no ethics cue was present. In a related study,
Owhoso (2002) used the same data presented by Abdolmohammadi and Owhoso to
investigate the effect of auditors’ gender (interacted with the experience and the presence
of a positive ethics cue) on the auditors’ assessment of fraud risk, but no gender effect
was detected.
Chung and Monroe (2001) test the selectivity hypothesis in an auditing context.
The selectivity hypothesis states that females are more likely to consider all cues in highcomplexity tasks and, therefore, make more accurate judgments as opposed to males who
are more likely to consider only some of the cues. Participants (100 males and 58
females) were asked to decide whether the balance in inventory was fairly presented
based on a hypothetical narrative. Task complexity was considered high or low
depending on the number of cues included in the narrative. The results supported the
hypothesis by revealing a significant interaction between gender and task-complexity
(low or high depending on the number of cues regarding the account balance of inventory
in a narrative), the direction of which indicated that females made slightly more accurate
judgments in high-complexity tasks.
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2.2.3. Expanding the Management Fraud Literature
To expand professional literature, this research project will consider the auditor’s
assessment of management’s integrity with respect to management fraud risk. When
assessing fraud risk, the auditor must make a judgment about the existence of all three
elements of Cressey’s (1953) triangle, but many academic studies have focused on
motive and opportunity (e.g., Apostolou, Hassell, and Webber 2000) used professionals
to classify risk factors as to motive or opportunity), and few academic studies have
considered the third point integrity (e.g., Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham (1989)
classified risk factors as to motive, opportunity, and attitude6).
When an auditor considers the likelihood of fraud, s/he cannot know for certain
whether the three elements actually existed in concert. Therefore, the likelihood of fraud
is not observable, so the auditor’s assessment or judgment of fraud risk is a function of
the auditor’s assessment of the three elements:
Auditor' s Assessment
=
of Fraud Risk

f Assessed +
 motives

Assessed
Assessed propensity
+
, (2)
opportunities
to rationalize 

where assessed propensity to rationalize is the auditor’s assessment of the integrity of
management. Therefore, the process, as described by Libby and Lewis (1977), of how an
auditor assesses the risk of fraud is an interaction between (1) the cues an auditor receives
and (2) the auditor’s assessment of those cues. Because two auditors may make different
assessments of the same cues, the fraud literature should benefit from understanding
which personal characteristics affect auditor judgment.
Prior literature, as reviewed in Nieschwietz, Schultz, and Zimbleman (2000),
compared the known risk of fraud from actual cases to the auditor’s assessment of the
risk of fraud, but has not considered how the auditor affects that assessment. This
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proposed research will test the interaction between the (1) implicit theory of integrity
held by an individual internal auditor with (2) the integrity cue given about the client to
determine whether that interaction has significant effects on that auditor’s assessment of
management fraud risk. Auditors will vary in their implicit theory of integrity (entity or
incremental), and the integrity cues7 will be manipulated in the research instrument (three
levels of integrity) resulting in a 2×3 design.
2.3. End Notes
1

The method of determining a subject’s implicit theory is similar to the method used
by McConnell (2001).

2

COSO is a joint venture of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), the American Accounting Association (AAA), the Financial Executives
Institute (FEI), and Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and the National Association
of Accountants (NAA) (COSO 2001).

3

In the subsequent standard, SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997), the word “irregularity” was
replaced with “fraud.”

4

SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997) discusses both management fraud (financial statement
fraud) and employee fraud (misappropriation of assets or defalcation). Though both
are of importance in an audit setting, this study addresses management fraud only.
Therefore, throughout the remainer of this proposal, the word “fraud” refers to
management fraud.

5

The auditors slightly outperformed the models in the nonfraud cases.

6

Lobbecke, Eining, and Willingham (1989) present the formula P(MI) = f(C,M,A),
which indicates that the probability of material irregularities (MI) is a function of (c)
conditions or opportunities, (m) motives, and (A) attitude or ethical values of the
perpetrator.

7

To limit the potential for confounded variables, the motive to commit fraud and the
opportunity to commit fraud will be held constant in this study; therefore, their effects
cannot be measured. This study is limited to an investigation of the third point of the
fraud triangle and how auditors’ assessments of this point may vary.
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3. RESEARCH METHOD
The purpose of this study is to examine how the auditor’s determination of fraud
risk differs due to personal characteristics. Specifically, does an auditor’s implicit theory
of integrity effect his/her assessment of fraud risk?
3.1. Hypothesis Development
During the planning and risk assessment phase of an audit, auditors consider
many elements, including the internal control system and results of analytical procedures.
As a function of understanding the internal control system, auditors must evaluate the
control environment, which “defines the tone of an organization and the way it operates”
and “foster[s] integrity and control consciousness” (Steinberg 1993). The control
environment is also known as “soft controls” and includes management’s philosophy,
integrity, and ethics. Auditing these soft controls is growing in importance because a lack
of these types of controls “increases the possibility that other, more traditional controls,
such as approvals and reconciliations, may be overridden” (Hubbard 2002).
Internal auditors gather evidence about soft controls in their organization through
interviews and questionnaires. Therefore, this evidence is based on the auditor’s
impressions formed about the reliability, truthfulness, and integrity of people, not
transactions (i.e., subjective, not objective). Standards also explicitly require that these
soft controls be evaluated. SAS No. 78, entitled Consideration of Internal Control in a
Financial Statement Audit: An Amendment to Statement on Auditing Standards No 55,8
instructs auditors to consider such factors as the “integrity and ethical values,”
“commitment to competence,” and “management’s philosophy and operating style”
(AICPA 1996). In addition, SAS No. 99, entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
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Statement Audit, directs auditors to consider “attitudes/rationalizations to justify
fraudulent action” (AICPA 2003, ¶31). The assessment of soft controls such as integrity
of management is difficult to quantify, but an auditor’s assessment of soft controls is
likely to impact the assessment of other risks that are often quantified (e.g., control risk,
fraud risk).
H1(alt):

When assessing the risk of management fraud, internal auditors
will assess the risk of fraud higher, the lower the client’s
integrity.

Assessing integrity is not an objective procedure, but a subjective impression
formed by interacting with the client’s management and witnessing their behavior. The
impression formed is affected both by the actions of management and the auditor’s
beliefs about human nature. In other words, two different auditors, after the same
encounter with management, may form different impressions. The implicit theory
(Dweck and Leggett 1988) demonstrates how impression formation is different between
two different classifications of people: (1) entity theorists and (2) incremental theorists.
In the extreme, entity theorists believe a personal characteristic is fixed (unchanging) in
an individual and expect similar future behavior from that individual; incremental
theorists believe the characteristic is malleable and do not form expectations about future
behavior.
When assessing the control environment, internal auditors who hold an entity
theory of integrity may be more likely than incremental theorists to form lasting
impressions of management that they will use to predict or anticipate other actions by
management. Applying this theory, it is predicted that when assessing the risk of fraud,
entity theorists will rely more on the integrity cues of management than incremental
theorists.
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H2(alt):

When assessing the risk of management fraud, internal auditors
who demonstrate an entity theory of integrity will weight the
moral inferences of the client’s integrity more heavily than those
who demonstrate an incremental theory of integrity.

Auditors use many pieces of information when assessing the risk of fraud and
completing other tasks during the planning process. As questions arise in an auditor’s
mind, additional information relevant to making decisions can be obtained. Applying the
implicit theory of integrity, entity theorists are more likely than incremental theorists to
request additional information related to the character of management.
H3(alt):

Internal auditors who demonstrate an entity theory of integrity
will be more likely than those who demonstrate an incremental
theory of integrity to request character-related information about
management.

Table 1 summarizes the three hypotheses in both the alternative and null forms.
3.2. Required Subjects
This research examines the effect of two independent variables and their
interaction on an internal auditor’s assessment of management fraud risk: (1) integrity
cues of management (high, medium, and low) and (2) the internal auditor’s implicit
theory of integrity (entity versus incremental). The level of management’s integrity will
be manipulated between subjects in an audit-scenario narrative, yielding three version of
the research instrument. Each subject will receive one version of the narrative upon
which to base answers, and responses will be compared between subjects. In addition,
subjects will demonstrate their implicit theory of integrity as either entity or incremental.
Therefore, this between-subjects, quasi-experiment has a 3×2 design resulting in six cells.
The power of a study is influenced by the sample size. When conducting an
analysis of variance between cells (which is done later in this study), power is assessed
by the number of observations per cell. Bratcher, Moran and Zimmer (1970) developed
26

Table 1. Research hypotheses
Alternative Hypotheses
H1 When assessing the risk of
management fraud, internal auditors
will assess the risk of fraud higher,
the lower the client’s integrity.

Null Hypotheses
Client’s integrity will not affect an
internal auditor’s assessment of the
risk of management fraud.

H2

When assessing the risk of
management fraud, internal auditors
who demonstrate an entity theory of
integrity will weight the moral
inferences of the client’s integrity
more heavily than those who
demonstrate an incremental theory of
integrity.

The implicit theory of integrity
demonstrated by an internal auditor
will not affect how that auditor
weights the client’s integrity cues
when assessing the risk of
management fraud.

H3

Internal auditors who demonstrate an
entity theory of integrity will be more
likely than those who demonstrate an
incremental theory of integrity to
request character-related information
about management.

The implicit theory of integrity
demonstrated by an internal auditor
will not affect the type of additional
information requested about
management.

tables for selecting the minimum sample size per cell needed to achieve a certain level of
power. To use the tables, the following four inputs must be set or estimated:
1. α, alpha-risk or the risk of incorrect rejection (of the null);
2. β, beta-risk or the risk of incorrect acceptance, where power is 1–β;
3. r, the number of cells in the analysis of variance; and
4. ∆/σ, the ratio of the absolute value of the difference between the maximum and
minimum cell means to the pooled standard deviation, where ∆ is set to define the
smallest effect the test is designed to detect.
Alpha was set at the traditional of 0.05, beta set at 0.20 (for a power of 0.80), and r for
this study is six cells. Using the standard deviation from preliminary data, the ratio of ∆
to σ was approximately 1.25, which requires a sample size of at least 18 observations per
cell to achieve a power of .80.
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By randomizing the three versions of the instrument, the subjects are randomly
assigned into one of three cells defined by the integrity of management. However,
implicit theory of integrity is a personal trait of the subject over which there is no
experimental control. Therefore, data collection should continue until the minimum
number of observations in the six cells is 18, which could significantly influence the
sample size.9
3.3. The Research Instrument and Variable Definitions
The internal auditors in this experiment were given the research instrument, which
contained all instructions and forms necessary to participate in this experiment. The
research instrument, which was available in paper and electronic format, contained three
sections in which the subjects (1) answered questions to depict their personal implicit
theory of integrity, (2) read a narrative about a company and their charge as an internal
auditor at that company and completed fraud risk assessment tasks, and (3) provided
demographic information. See Appendix A for one complete version of the research
instrument. The tasks in the first two sections and the narrative are described in detail
below, followed by a description of the randomization techniques used on the research
instruments.
3.3.1. Measuring Implicit Theory
To determine a subject’s implicit theory (whether they are entity or incremental
theorists), prior research has used multiple statements to which the subject indicated their
agreement or disagreement using a Likert-type scale (as seen in Gervey et al. 1999; Levy,
Stroessner and Dweck 1998; and Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu 1997). These three
statements are listed in generic form below:
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1. A person’s _____ is something very basic about him/her, and it cannot be
changed much.
2. Whether a person is _____ or not is deeply ingrained in his/her personality; it
cannot be changed much.
3. There is not much that can be done to change a person’s _____.
The word or phrase that should fill the blanks depends on what implicit theory a
researcher is testing. For example, if a researcher wanted to determine a subject’s implicit
theory of intelligence, the first statements would read, “A person’s intelligence is
something very basic about him/her, and it cannot be changed much.” 10
The subjects of this research project are internal auditors, who as professionals
maintain their own integrity and who also assess the integrity of others. Therefore, the
subject’s implicit theory of integrity is determined in this study. Incorporating the
AICPA’s and IIA’s definition of integrity,11 the three statements that were used to
determine each subject’s implicit theory of integrity are listed below:
1. A person’s integrity is something very basic about him/her, and it cannot be
changed much.
2. Whether a person is honest and candid or not is deeply ingrained in his/her
personality and cannot be changed much.
3. There is not much that can be done to change a person’s integrity traits such as
whether s/he is self-serving or law-abiding or has integrity, honesty, or diligence.
Subjects were asked in Task 1 to agree or disagree with these statements on a six-point
Likert-type scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree).12 Prior studies (e.g., McConnell
2001; Gervey et al. 1999; Chiu et al. 1997) have embedded the three statements in a

29

series of similar questions so that the three statements of interest were obviously the
focus of the research, thus avoiding pretest effects. In this experiment, these three
statements were randomly included with seven other statements13 answered on the same
scale.
3.3.1.1. Implicit Theory Variables
To calculate a score for a subject’s implicit theory, each subject’s responses to the
three statements of interest were averaged.14 This average score were used as an
independent variable in two ways for each subject (as seen in Gervey et al. 1999). First,
implicit theory was measured as a dichotomous, nominal variable. Subjects with an
average score above 3.5 were considered to be entity theorists, their average score
indicating that they agree with the three statements (integrity is pretty constant in a
person). Subjects with an average score below 3.5 were considered to be incremental
theorists, their average score indicating that they disagree with the three statements
(integrity is a malleable trait in a person). This dichotomous variable (referred to as IT1)
was used in statistical tests to represent the subjects’ implicit theory and was coded as
one for entity theorists and zero for incremental theorists.
It is conceivable that the first measurement (dichotomous) does not completely
capture a subject’s implicit theory. For example, an entity theorist with an average score
of six (strongly agree) may make stronger moral inferences than an entity theorist with an
average score of four (somewhat agree). For that reason, the average implicit theory score
also was used as a continuous, ordinal measure (referred to as IT2). IT2 was constructed
using the average response of the three statements.
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3.3.2. Narrative Presentation
The second part of the research instrument includes a narrative for the subjects to
read. The narrative establishes an internal auditing planning scenario for Chess Cab, a
fictitious taxicab company, which is a division of a company called TransportNation, Inc.
The narrative includes an excerpt from the audit-planning memo, which focuses attention
to a change in analytics—a downward trend in taxicab maintenance costs relative to
revenues. There was one experimental manipulation in the narrative: the integrity of
Chess Cab’s Director, named Conaway, who stands to earn a bonus related to this
maintenance-cost-to-sales ratio, will be depicted as either high, medium, or low. This
manipulation results in three versions of the narrative presented to the subjects.
In each of the three versions, Conaway has been asked to resign from the fundraising committee of a children’s home. Descriptions of the manipulation of integrity are
presented in Table 2. The entire narrative is presented in the research instrument shown
in Appendix A, and the narrative text versions are presented in Appendix B.
3.3.2.1. Integrity Variables
The variable CUE was used as an independent variable to account for the integrity
cue given in each respondent’s version of the research instrument. This is a nominal
variable coded one for high, zero for medium, and negative one (–1) for low.
3.3.3. Assessments of the Risk of Fraud
After reading the narrative, auditors assessed the risk of fraud as an explanatory
factor for the change in maintenance costs in two tasks: (1) feasibility of fraud and (2) the
likelihood of fraud. Both tasks are discussed in detail below.
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Table 2. Integrity manipulations
CUE
Integrity manipulationa
Low
Conaway is asked to resign because Conaway missed or was late to
Integrity
fund-raising meetings and because Conaway intentionally misled
contributors to boost contributions.
Medium
Integrity

Conaway is asked to resign because Conaway missed or was late to
fund-raising meetings.

High
Integrity

Conaway is asked to resign because Conway told to truth resulting in
the loss a contributor.

a

For exact text used in integrity manipulation, see Appendix B.

3.3.3.1. Risk of Fraud—Feasibility
The narrative contains a graph representing a decline in maintenance expenses
relative to sales. In Task 2A, subjects assessed the feasibility of seven explanations for
the decline: 15
•

external factors,

•

internal factors from the Chess Cab division,

•

internal factors by TransportNation,

•

errors by the Chess Cab division,

•

errors by TransportNation,

•

intentional manipulation (fraud) by the Chess Cab division,

•

intentional manipulation (fraud) by TransportNation.

(For the actual questions to which subjects responded, see Task 2A in Appendix A.) The
subjects’ responses were made by marking one circle in a series of 51 unnumbered
circles. Respondents were instructed that the farther to the right they make their mark, the
more feasible they believe the factor to be.
Two measures of the dependent variable risk of fraud were taken from this task.
Of the seven evaluations made during this task, two are related to fraud: one on the part
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of Chess Cab (directed by Conaway) and one on the part of TransportNation. The
integrity cue given is about Conaway. No cues about the integrity of any TransportNation
personnel were given. The first measure of the risk of fraud (RF1) was be calculated by
counting the circle marked when asked about the feasibility of intentional manipulation
on the part of Chess Cab. RF1 was scaled using the following formula:

RF1 =

x –1
,
50

(3)

where x is the circle marked counting from the left. RF1 will be between zero and one.
Because there is no information given about the integrity of the personnel of
TransportNation, the assessed feasibility of fraud by TransportNation is not of interest to
this study. However, the difference between the feasibility of fraud on the part of Chess
Cab and on the part of TransportNation can be thought to be affected by the integrity cue
given about the director of Chess Cab. Therefore, the second measure of the risk of fraud
(RF2), was calculated as the difference in the circle marked for Chess and the circle
marked for TransportNation, scaled between zero and one using formula (3).
3.3.3.2. Risk of Fraud—Probability

In Task 2B, subjects assessed the probability that the decrease in relative
maintenance costs is due to four factors: (1) external environment, (2) internal
environment, (3) unintentional error, or (4) intentional manipulation. To complete this
task, subjects were asked to distribute 100 points among the four categories, which
should capture the subject’s opinion about the relative probability that each of four
factors was the cause of the decrease in the maintenance-cost-to-sales ratio. The third
measure of the dependent variable risk of fraud (RF3) is calculated as the proportion of
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points (number divided by 100) assigned to intentional manipulation and falls between
zero and one.
3.3.4. Other Variables Measured
3.3.4.1. Integrity Inference Manipulation Check

To measure the strength of the actual integrity inferences made by the subjects,
they were asked in Task 2C to assess the degree to which they agree that the director
possesses six character traits on a six-point, Likert-type scale (strongly disagree to
strongly agree). The six traits are comprised of the following: four integrity traits (selfserving, responsible, integrity, and candid) taken from the definitions of integrity in the
AICPA Code of Profession Conduct (AICPA 2001) and the IIA Code of Ethics (IIA
2001); and two distracter traits related to intelligence (unintelligent and well informed).
The responses from this exercise were coded from one (strongly disagree) to six
(strongly agree). 16 The variable INFER1 is the score on the statement about integrity.
The score of the four integrity traits were averaged to form the variable INFER2.
Extreme scores for either inference variable represent stronger inferences.
3.3.4.2. Additional Information

The narrative provided in this experimental setting contains all the information
available. However, auditors are likely to want additional information. After the auditors
made determinations of the risk of fraud using the information provided, they were given
the opportunity in task 2D to list up to six additional pieces of information they would
like to have to prepare an audit plan. Each piece of information was coded as to whether
it is related to the character of the director. The variable CINFO is the number of
character information requests divided by the total number of requests to create a
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continuous variable between zero and one representing the proportion of character
information requested. For example, if a respondent listed five additional pieces of
information and two were related to character, the CINFO variable is scored as .4 (two
divided by five).
Additionally, each piece of information requested was coded as to whether it is
related to the bonus the director stands to receive. The variable BINFO is the number of
character information requests divided by the total number of requests to create a
continuous variable between zero and one, representing the proportion of bonus
information requested. All variables measured are listed in Table 3.
3.3.5. Randomizing Questions in the Research Instrument

Subjects either received a paper or electronic format of the research instrument. In
every instrument, the tasks were presented in the same order:
•

10 statements (three of interest) for assessing implicit theory (Task 1),

•

Seven questions (two of interest) about the feasibility of explanations for the
change in analytic (Task 2A),

•

Four factors (one of interest) among which 100 points are distributed (Task 2B),
and

•

Six statements (four of interest) about character traits (Task 2C).

However, within each set of questions, the order of questions/statements is randomized
along with the version of the narrative (high, medium, or low integrity). If the subject
received the electronic version of the research instrument, movement from task to task
was controlled by macros that also randomized the questions. Paper versions were printed
individually so that the order of questions was randomized. The purpose of these
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Table 3. Experimental variables
Name
Measures
Description
Panel A: Independent Variables
IT1
Implicit
A dichotomous variable coded as 1 for
theory
entity theorists and 0 for incremental
theorists

Source
Task 1

IT2

Implicit
theory

A continuous random variable between 1
and 6 where lower (higher) values represent
incremental (entity) theorists

Task 1

CUE

Integrity

As described in the narrative, coded as 1 for
high, 0 for medium, and –1 for low integrity

Instrument
Version

Panel B: Dependent Variables
RF1
Risk of fraud A random variable between 0 and 1 where
higher values represent higher feasibility of
fraud as a explanatory factor for a change in
analytic; (x–1)÷50, where x is the xth circle
of 51 marked for intentional manipulation

Task 2A

RF2

Risk of fraud A random variable between 0 and 1 where
higher values represent more feasibility that
fraud was on the part of Chess Cab than
TransportNation

Task 2A

RF3

Risk of fraud A random variable between 0 and 1 where
higher values represent a greater probability
of fraud as an explanatory factor for change
in analytic; portion of 100 points assigned
to intentional manipulation

Task 2B

CINFO

Character
information
requested

A continuous random variable between 0
and 1, measured as the proportion of
character-related information requested

Task 2D

BINFO

Bonus
information
requested

A continuous random variable between 0
and 1, measured as the proportion of bonusrelated information requested

Task 2D

Panel C: Manipulation Check Variables
INFER1 Integrity
A continuous variable between 1 and 6,
inference
measured as the score representing the
degree to which the director has integrity

INFER 2

Integrity
A continuous variable between 1 and 6,
characteristic measured as the average of four scores
inference
representing the degree to which the
director possesses four integrity traits
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Task 2C

Task 2C

randomization techniques is to minimize or eliminate the order effects sometimes
associated with questions. During the statistical analysis, tests were conducted to identify
whether any order effects are present.17 See Appendix B for a detailed description of the
variations in research instruments between subjects.
3.4. Planned Statistical Tests of Hypotheses

In general, two main variables (independent variables), (1) the internal auditor’s
implicit theory (IT1 or IT2) and (2) client integrity cue (CUE), are investigated to
determine their effect on the risk of fraud (dependent variable RF1, RF2, or RF3)
assessed by the internal auditor. Hypothesis 1 addresses the main effect of integrity on
risk of fraud. Hypothesis 2 addresses the effect of the interaction of the two independent
variables on the dependent variables. (No hypothesis is made regarding the main effect of
the auditor’s implicit theory on risk of fraud.)
Hypothesis 3 tests the main effect of the internal auditor’s implicit theory on two
other dependent variables related to information requested by the respondent. A
discussion of the models and planned hypothesis tests for this research is given below.
First however, the test of the manipulation check is discussed.
3.4.1. Manipulation Check

The level of integrity of Chess Cab’s director is experimentally manipulated (see
Table 2); the independent variable CUE is coded as one for high, zero for medium, and
negative one (–1) for low to represent this manipulation. As a manipulation check, the
respondents were asked to assess the director’s integrity. Respondent’s who received the
high-integrity version of the instrument should have assessed the level of integrity higher
than those who received the medium-integrity and low-integrity versions.
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The respondents’ impressions of client integrity were assessed directly on the
research instrument in Task 2C by responses to the statement “Chris Conaway seems to
have integrity.” The respondents marked one of six circles coded one through six,
representing strongly disagree to strongly agree. The value one to six is assigned to
variable INFER1. In addition, three other statements related to integrity traits are also
presented in Task 2C: “Chris Conaway seems responsible,” “Chris Conaway seems
candid,” and “Chris Conaway seems to be self-serving.” The first two of these three
statements are also assigned a value of one to six based on the same response scale. The
third is scored one to six and reversed by subtracting the score from seven because selfserving is a negative trait contra to integrity. The variable INFER2 is an average of the
response scores for the four integrity traits.18
To determine whether the manipulation affected the respondents’ assessments of
the client’s integrity, four techniques were used. First, examining the correlation between
cue (an ordinal variable) and both inference variable (INFER1 and INFER2) will
determine the degree to which the manipulation and the respondents’ inferences move
together. Second, a series of boxplots will depict the effect of manipulation graphically
and identify variability an potential outliers within each level of the manipulation.
Third, one-way ANOVA tests using CUE as the independent (grouping) variable
will identify the statistical significance of the manipulation on the respondents’
inferences (INFER1 and INFER2, in separate tests). Significance of the variable CUE
will indicate that the manipulation had an effect on the respondents’ assessments of the
client’s integrity; nonsignificant results will not support a successful manipulation of
client’s integrity in the research instruments.
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The variable CUE may be significant, but that result does not imply that a cue
intended to represent high integrity causes a higher value of the variables INFER1 or
INFER2. Therefore, the final examination of the manipulation was a series of two-sample
t-tests were used to determine whether the following directions hold:
•

INFER1CUE=H > INFER1CUE=L;

•

INFER1CUE=H > INFER1CUE=M; and

•

INFER1CUE=M > INFER1CUE=L.

These tests were repeated for INFER2.
Because the manipulation of client integrity is the cornerstone of this research
project, it is important that the manipulation is effective. If the manipulation is not
effective, the remaining tests can be conducted using the inferred level of client integrity
(INFER1 and INFER2) rather than the manipulation variable (CUE); however,
interpretation of the results will be slightly different.
3.4.2. Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 tests the main effect of client integrity (CUE, independent variable)
on assessed risk of fraud (dependent variable). Risk of fraud is measured in three ways in
the research instrument. First in task 2A, seven questions (in random order) are asked
about what could have feasibly caused the change in analytic shown in the narrative.19
The first question of interest is the following: “How feasible is it that the decrease in
maintenance expenses relative to sales was the result of fraudulent activities on the part
of Chris Conaway?” Conaway is the member of management about whom the integrity
cue is given. The response is made by marking one of 51 unnumbered circles where the
circles farther to the right indicate more feasibility. The first measure of risk of fraud
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(RF1) is scaled between zero and one using the circle number (counting from left to
right) marked (see formula 3).
Second, another question in task 2A, asks “How feasible is it that the decrease in
maintenance expenses relative to sales was the result of fraudulent activities on the part
of Terry Alexander?” The response is made in the same way; however, no integrity cue is
given about Alexander. The second measure of risk of fraud (RF2) is the difference
between the response for Conaway and Alexander.
Third in task 2B, the respondents were asked to distribute 100 points between four
explanatory factors to represent the likelihood that the change in analytic is a result of the
factors, which are internal environment, external environment, intentional manipulation,
and misstatement.20 The third measure of risk of fraud (RF3) is the portion of 100 points
assigned to intentional manipulation (fraud).
To test hypothesis 1, four tests were conducted. First a MANOVA test was
conducted to assess the effect of CUE on the matrix of the three dependent variables,
RF1, RF2, and RF3. In addition, three ANOVA tests were conducted using the following
model:

RFij = µ + α i + ε ij ,

(4)

where RFij represents the jth observed value of one of the three risk of fraud variables (i
representing the level of CUE), µ represents the mean of all RFij responses, and αi
represents the effect the the ith level of and CUE (+1 for high, 0 for medium, and –1 for
low). Hypothesis 1 will be supported if CUE affects the means of the subsamples, and if
as CUE increases, risk of fraud decreases. To test directionality individual t-tests will be
conducted between the levels of CUE.
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3.4.3. Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2 tests the interaction effect of the client integrity (CUE, independent
variable) and the respondents’ implicit theory of integrity (IT, independent variable) on
assessed risk of fraud (RF, dependent variable). Implicit theory of integrity is measured
in two ways using the response to three statements about a person’s integrity (see section
3.3.1.1.). The first is a dichotomous variable coded as one for entity theorists and zero for
incremental theorists. The second is a continuous variable between zero and one, where
smaller values represent incremental theorists and larger values represent entity theorists.
To test Hypothesis 2, eight tests were conducted. The first four tests included a
MANOVA and three ANOVA using the dichotomous measure of implicit theory (IT1).
The model for these four tests is shown below:
RFijk = µ + α i + β j + αβ ij + ε ijk ,

(5)

where RFijk is the kth observed value of one of the three risk of fraud variables (in the ith
level of CUE and the jth level of IT),21 µ represents the mean of all RFijk responses, αi
represents the effect the the ith level of and CUE (+1 for high, 0 for medium, and –1 for
low), βj is the jth level of IT1 (1 for entity theorists and 0 for incremental theorists), and
αβij is the interaction of these two variables. To support the second hypothesis, the
interaction effect should be significant.
The remaining four tests of hypothesis 2 include a multivariate multiple
regression, followed by three multiple regressions. The model for these regressions is
shown below:
RF = β 0 + β1CUE + β 2 IT + β 3 CUE × IT + e ,

(6)

where RF represents one of the three risk of fraud variables or the matrix of RF responses
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in the multivariate regression, CUE is the variable that represents the manipulated level
of integrity (+1 for high, 0 for medium, and –1 for low), and IT represents one of the two
implicit theory variables. By interacting the integrity cue and implicit theory variables,
the value of β3 represents how extreme the risk of fraud assessments were by entity
theorists as compared to incremental theorists. Hypothesis 2 will be supported if β3<0.
Essentially, β3 represents the modification of β1 related to the respondents implicit
theory.
There is no theory that supports the effect of the implicit theory on the assessed
risk of fraud. Therefore no hypothesis is stated related to the main effect of implicit
theory on the risk of fraud. Accordingly, no expectations are made and no statistical tests
were conducted related to β2.
3.4.4. Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 tests the effect of the respondent’s implicit theory of integrity (IT,
independent variable) on the type of additional information requested by the respondent.
If entity theorists do rely on character-related information more heavily than other types
as theorized, it is expected that entity theorists will request character-related additional
information significantly more than will incremental theorists. In task 2D, the
respondents were given six blank spaces to request additional information before
finalizing the audit program. The type of information requested is measured in two ways.
Each piece of information requested is coded as being character-related (related to
Conaway, the member of management about whom the integrity cue is given) or related
to the bonus Conaway will receive for the reduction in the analytic described in the
narrative. CINFO is the number of character-related pieces of information requested
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divided by the total number of pieces of additional information requested. BINFO is the
number of bonus-related information requested divided by the number of pieces of
information requested.
To test hypothesis 3, two two-sample t-tests were performed comparing the
average INFO score for entity theorists to the average INFO score of the incremental
theorists, where INFO represents either CINFO or BINFO. Hypothesis 3 will be
supported if INFOEntity>INFOIncremental, indicating that the entity theorists are requesting a
larger portion of character- or bonus-related information.
3.5. End Notes

8 SAS No. 78 (AICPA 1996) modifies SAS No. 55, entitled Consideration of Internal
Control in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA 1988b). Hereafter, the two
Statements will be cited together as SAS No. 78.
9 Test data (using accounting majors) indicates that entity theorists outnumber
incremental theorists by a factor of two to one. Gervey, Chiu, Hong, and Dweck
(1999) used psychology majors and found a more even split between entity (47%)
and incremental theorists (53%). A fairly even distribution is expected because
internal auditors come from a wide variety of disciplines.
10 Validation of this three-question measure of implicit theory was described in Levy,
Stroessner, and Dweck (1998). The validation involved giving a large battery of
questions which included each of the three questions two times: (1) as shown where
agreement indicates entity theorist, and (2) written as an opposite where agreement
indicates incremental theorist (e.g., “Everyone, no matter who they are, can
significantly change their basic characteristic.”). Correlations between the responses
was .73 indicating that agreement with the entity theory represents disagreement with
an incremental theory (and the reverse).
11 The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct describes a person of integrity as one who
is “honest and candid” (AICPA 2001, ¶54.02). The IIA’s Rules of Conduct describes
integrity as working with “honesty, diligence, and responsibility,” law-abiding, and
ethical (IIA 2001, ¶1.1.1-4).
12 A six-point scale was chosen for two reasons: (1) An even numbered scale was
chosen so no middle or neutral point is available; and (2) six was chosen so that each
half of the scale would have a center point toward which a respondent would gravitate
first; then modify that point up or down (Leary 2001). For example, on the upper half
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of the scale, the center point, agree, can be modified to strongly agree or somewhat
agree.
13 The seven distracter statements were adapted with permission from the “Locus of
Control & Attribution Style Test” (Jerabek 1996) which contains 33 questions. The
questions were originally responded to on a 5-point Likert-type scale with the center
answer identified as “partially agree/disagree.” For the sake of consistency, a 6-point
Likert-type scale will be used to respond to all statements.
14 For example, if a subject agrees (5), strongly agrees (6), and somewhat disagrees (3)
with the three statements, the average would be 4.67 [(5+6+3)÷3].
15 Church, McMillan, and Schneider (1998, 2001a, 2001b) used three factors: (1)
environment, (2) error, and (3) fraud. In this study, environmental factors are
separated into external (outside the company’s control) and internal (controllable
through policies and procedures).
16 The score from the negative traits (self-serving and unintelligent) will be reversed to
calculate an average score, because agreeing that the director is self-serving is
disagreeing that the director is not self-serving. The conversion is made by
subtracting the score from seven. For example, as score of strongly disagree, coded as
one, will be converted to a score of six (seven minus one).
17 Some paper instruments contained the same order of questions in individual tasks. If
these versions affected the responses, the effect will be found in tests for order
effects.
18 Two additional statements, used as distractors, are made that are unrelated to
integrity: “Chris Conaway seems to be intelligent” and “Chris Conaway seems to be
well-informed.” The response scores to these statements are not used in this research
project.
19 Two questions of interest are related to fraud. Five questions are distracters and are
related to external environment, internal environment, and errors. The response scores
to these questions are not used in this research project.
20 Distribution of 100 points between explanations was used by Church, McMillan, and
Schneider (2001a and 2001b).
21 RF represents the matrix of RF responses for the MANOVA test.
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4. STATISTICAL RESULTS

This chapter contains a description of data collection and the tests of the
hypotheses in the following six sections: responses and demographics, manipulation
check, tests of hypothesis 1, tests of hypothesis 2, tests of hypothesis 3, and tests for order
effects. The remaining section contains alternate tests of hypotheses 1 and 2.
4.1. Responses and Demographics

The hypotheses in this study address how internal auditors use integrity cues
when assessing the risk of management fraud. Therefore, this experiment requires
subjects with experience as an internal auditor to respond to the research instrument. This
section contains a description of how the research instruments were administered, the
number of useable responses received (and reasons for discarding responses), as well as
demographic information about the internal auditors who made up the final sample of
responses.
4.1.1. Data Collection

The research instrument was administered in three ways: (1) in corporate internal
auditing departments, (2) to local chapters of the Institute of Internal Auditors, and (3) to
training seminars for internal auditors. First, two corporations circulated paper versions
of the research instrument (see Appendix A) in their internal auditing departments. Of
108 instruments delivered to the corporations, 27 responses were received via individual
postage-paid reply envelopes (response rate of 25%). Second, the paper versions of the
research instrument were distributed at four seminars (training sessions) and returned via
the seminar presenter yielding 70 responses.
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The third method used to collect data was via local chapters of the Institute of
Internal Auditors (IIA). Six chapter presidents of the IIA agreed to distribute an
electronic version of the research instrument (see Appendix B). An electronic version of
the research instrument created in Microsoft Excel was delivered via email to the
president of the local chapters who forwarded it via email to the chapter members.
Because these requests were essentially cold (i.e., the members did not agree to complete
the research instrument prior to receiving it), a lottery was offered as incentive to
participate.22 The electronic instrument was designed to be downloaded, answered using
mouse clicks, and saved and emailed back to the researcher. However, the email to which
the instrument was attached gave the respondent the option to request a paper copy of the
instrument.23 The six local chapters had approximately 900 members, and 66 responses
were received (approximate response rate of 7.33%); 59 were electronic versions and
seven were paper. A total of 163 responses were received (27+70+66).
4.1.2. Useable Responses

Twenty-nine of the 163 responses received were unusable and discarded for the
following reasons. Two responses were students and reported no internal auditing
experience.24 Eight responses reported no demographic information, so their internal
auditing experience could not be determined. Nineteen responses were eliminated
because the respondent left blank critical, nondemographic responses that were needed
for formulating a dependent or independent variable. The final sample contained 134
responses. The responses and omissions are summarized in Table 4 by the source of the
response and in total.
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Table 4. Useable responses

Responses
Omitted:
Students
No demographic data
Critical data left blank
Total Omitted
Useable Responses

Corporations
27
0
1
4

Seminars
70
0
4
11

5
22

Local IIA
Chapters
66
2
3
4

15
55

Total
163
2
8
19

9
57

29
134

4.1.3. Sample Size and Power

Using the tables provided by Bratcher, Moran and Zimmer (1970) and
preliminary data, it was determined that a minimum of 18 observations was needed per
cell to obtain the desired level of power (see section 3.2.). In six cells, 108 responses
were needed (18×6). A total of 163 were collected to obtain 18 responses per cell.
However, after deletion of responses that were missing critical data, one cell contained
only 17 responses. The distribution of responses per cell is shown in Table 5.
4.1.4. Demographic Data

The 134 respondents in the final sample reported having an average of more than
six years of auditing experience, of which more than four years are in internal auditing.
They reported having a total of 83 certifications and various degrees including 36 postbaccalaureate. The demographic information collected from respondents is summarized
in Table 6. Respondents reported taking an average of 17 minutes to complete the
research instrument.
Table 5. Responses per cell in a 2×3 design
CUE: Integrity of management
Respondents’ Implicit Theory
High
Medium
Low
Incremental Theorist
18
23
20
Entity Theorist
32
24
17
Totals
50
47
37
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Total
61
73
134

Table 6. Demographics of respondents
Panel A: Experience

Auditing Experience (years) a
Internal Auditing Experience (years)
Experience with topic b
Panel B: Education

Accounting
Business (nonaccounting)
Nonbusiness
Total

Mean
6.37
4.54
0.52

Median
4.50
2.50
0.56

Min
0.08
0.08
0.00

Max
35.00
30.00
1.00

Bachelors Post-Baccalaureate c
74
8
45
26 d
17
2
136
36

Panel C: Certifications

Count
19
36
4
1
9
14
83

Certified Internal Auditor
Certified Public Accountant
Certified Fraud Examiner
Certified Management Accountant
Certified Information Systems Auditor
Other
Total
Panel D: Current job titles

Count
62
16
3
11
10
7
25
134

Auditor/Internal Auditor
Senior Auditor
Systems Auditor
Audit Manager
Director (VP) of Internal Audit
Consultant
Other
Total
a

Auditing experience includes both internal and external experience.

b

Respondents were asked, “What is your level of experience with the audit of expenses (not necessarily
vehicle maintenance expenses) as described in the task?” Their response was made by marking one of
a series of 51 circles ranging from Low to High. (The response mechanism was similar to Task 2A;
see section 3.3.3.1.) Their responses were scaled between 0 and 1; see equation (3).

c

The Post Baccalaureate degrees were all at the Master’s level except for one Juris Doctorate.

d

The Post Baccalaureate degrees labeled as business (nonaccounting) include MBAs.
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4.1.5. Demographic Effects on Variables

Eight variables were measured using subjects’ responses: implicit theory of
integrity (IT2),25 risk of fraud (three measures RF1, RF2, and RF3), integrity inference
(INFER1 and INFER2), and information requested (CINFO and BINFO). T-tests and
regressions are used to investigate whether subjects’ demographics had an effect on how
the subjects responded. The test statistics are presented in Table 7.
Table 7. Effect of demographics on response variables
Panel A: T-test statistic to test H0: Dichotomous demographic has no effect on variable
Dichotomous demographics a
Variable
CIA
CPA
CFE
CMA
CISA Other Cert Post-bacc
IT2
–0.47
–2.44 b –0.68
0.50
–0.85
–0.21
–0.41
b
b,c
RF1
–1.13
–1.39
–0.55
1.93
–0.99
2.83
0.22
RF2
–2.12 b –0.58
1.20
0.43
–1.31
1.14
0.68
RF3
–0.16
–0.04
–0.91
0.98
–0.41
1.25
0.80
INFER1
1.81
–0.22
–1.22
0.17
0.53
–1.50
–0.55
INFER2
1.52
–0.94
–0.55
–0.65
–0.05
–1.23
0.22
CINFO
–1.00
0.71
–0.44
0.46
0.27
–0.47
–1.18
BINFO
1.39
–1.61
–1.76
0.46
0.08
–1.04
1.49
Panel B: T-value to test H0: Continuous demographic has no effect on variable
Continuous demographics d
Months as
Months as
Experience
Time spent
Variable
an auditor
an internal auditor auditing expenses responding
IT2
0.46
–0.46
0.94
0.16
RF1
–1.62
0.80
1.95
–0.41
RF2
–1.43
1.21
2.03 b
0.83
RF3
–0.91
0.22
1.67
–0.38
INFER1
0.76
–0.12
–0.86
–0.67
INFER2
0.21
0.47
–0.74
–1.13
b
CINFO
2.13
–1.95
–0.82
0.73
BINFO
0.62
–0.07
–0.68
–0.28
a

The dichotomous demographics indicate whether or not the respondent holds a CIA, CPA,
CFE, CME, CMA, CISA, other certification, or post-baccalaureate degree.

b

Significant at the Type I error rate of 0.05.

c

Significant at the family-wise Type I error rate of 0.05 using a Bonferroni technique for
multiple comparisons.

d

The continuous demographics indicate (1) the level of experience the respondent had with
auditing expenses, (2) the time the respondent spent responding to the research instrument,
(3) the months the respondent spent as an auditor (both internal and external), and (4) the
months spent as an internal auditor.
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Seven dichotomous demographics were investigated for their effect on the eight
measured variables. These demographics represent whether the respondent (1) is a
Certified Internal Auditor, (2) is a Certified Public Accountant, (3) is a Certified Fraud
Examiner, (4) is a Certified Managerial Accountant, (5) is a Certified Information
Systems Auditor, (6) has another certification, and (7) holds a post-baccalaureate degree.
As shown in Panel A of Table 7, the individual t-test reveal four significant results.
However, when using a Bonferroni technique to control for family-wise error rate, only
one of the demographic variables was shown to significantly impact a dependent
variable.
First, the dependent variable RF2, the feasibility of fraud on the part of the client
about whom the integrity cue was given less the feasibility of fraud on the part of the
CEO, was significantly different depending on whether the respondent was a Certified
Internal Auditor. The respondents with a CIA had a mean RF2 of 0.28 while the nonCIAs had a mean RF2 of 0.13. Second, the independent variable implicit theory (IT) was
significantly different depending on whether or not the respondent was a Certified Public
Accountant. The CPAs had a mean value of 3.98 for IT2 while the non-CPAs had a mean
value of 3.44.
Third, the dependent variable RF1, the feasibility of fraud on the part of the client
about whom the integrity cue was given, was significantly different depending on
whether the respondent was a Certified Management Accountant. The respondents with a
CMA had a mean RF1 of 0.10 while the non-CMAs had a mean RF1 of 0.57. However,
only one respondent reported having a CMA making the mean of 0.10 the response of
one auditor. These three demographic variables were found to be significant at an alpha
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level of 0.05. However, when that alpha was distributed among the tests (of each
demographic) using a Bonferroni technique (used to control Type I error rates), these
three variables do not meet the criteria for statistical significance.
Finally, the dependent variable RF1, the feasibility of fraud on the part of the
client about whom the integrity cue was given, was significantly different depending on
whether the respondent held a certification not specifically asked about. The respondents
with these other certifications had a mean RF1 of 0.40, while those who reported no other
certifications had a mean RF1 of 0.59. These means are significantly different even when
controlling for family-wise error rate. No indication was given about what the other
certification was held by each respondent.
In addition, four continuous demographics were investigated for their effect on
the eight measured dependent variables. These four demographics represent (1) the
number of months the respondent has been an auditor (internal plus external), (2) the
number of months the respondent has been an internal auditor, (3) the respondent’s
experience auditing expenses, and (4) the amount of time the respondent reported
spending on the research instrument. As shown in Panel B of Table 7, two significant
results were found.
The variable RF2 was significantly affected by the amount of experience the
respondent reported having with the audit of expenses. As this self-reported experience
increased (between zero and one), regression analysis indicated that RF2 increased (β =
0.004, t-value = 2.03, p-value = 0.0447). Colbert’s (1989) review of experience literature
determined that the experience generally does not affect structured tasks, which most of
the tasks in this study are, but does affect unstructured and complex tasks. If any of these
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variables could be thought to measure a complex concept, it would be RF2, which
represents the difference in the feasibility of fraud perpetrated by Conaway (about whom
an integrity cue is given) and the feasibility of fraud perpetrated by Alexander (no
integrity cue). Though this test yields significant statistical results, the change in the
measurement is of little or no practical significance due to the small size of the parameter
estimate: as experience with audit of expenses (self-reported) moves from its minimum to
maximum value, the feasibility of fraud committed by Conaway as opposed to other
(scaled from zero to one) changes only 0.004.
Second, the variable CINFO, the proportion of information requested about
Conaway’s character, was significantly affected by the amount of time the respondent
spent as an auditor. As months auditing increased, regression analysis indicated that
CINFO increased (β = 0.0007, t-value = 2.13, p-value = 0.0351). Again, though this is a
statistically significant effect, the practical implications are very small: for every month
of audit experience, the proportion of (percent of total) character-related information
requested would increase 0.0007.
4.2. Manipulation Check

One variable, the level of integrity of a member of management (CUE), is
manipulated in this experiment. There are three levels of CUE: high, medium, and low. In
Task 2C, a manipulation check, the respondents were asked to assess six characteristics
of the member of management: four related to integrity and two related to intelligence.
The respondents used a six-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree) to
respond to the six statements, which were phrased “Chris Conaway seems ... .” For
example, “Chris Conaway seems to have integrity.”
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Three variables were constructed using these responses. INFER1 is the response
to the statement about integrity. INFER2 is the average of the four responses about
integrity traits (integrity, candid, responsible, and self-serving). INFER3 is the average of
the two distracter statements related to intelligence (well-informed and unintelligent).
Table 8, describes the responses to the manipulation check. To determine whether the
manipulation affected the respondents’ assessments of the client’s integrity, four
techniques were used: (1) boxplots, (2) correlation between CUE and the respondents’
inferences, (3) ANOVA tests to determine the significance of CUE on the response, and
(4) a series of two-sample t-tests determine directionality of the manipulation effect. The
details of these examinations follow.

Table 8. Manipulation check responses and statistics
Panel A: Responses to manipulation check
Variables a
Mean
Std Dev
INFER1
3.17
1.04
INFER2
3.20
0.84
INFER3
4.04
0.68
Panel B: Responses to manipulation check by integrity cue subgroup
CUE = High
CUE = Medium
CUE = Low
Variables
Mean
Std Dev
Mean
Std Dev
Mean
Std Dev
INFER1
3.81
0.88
3.17
1.07
2.72
0.88
INFER2
3.81
0.77
3.09
0.76
2.86
0.72
INFER3
4.32
0.58
3.99
0.73
3.88
0.66
a

INFER1 is the subjects’ response to the statement about to integrity.
INFER2 is the average of the four responses to the statements related to integrity: integrity, candid,
responsible, and self-serving. (Because it is a negative characteristic, the self-serving variable is
reversed.)
INFER3 is the average of the remaining two characteristics not related to integrity: well-informed and
unintelligent. (Unintelligent is reversed.)
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4.2.1. Graphical Depiction of Integrity Inference

Side-by-side boxplots are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The boxplots indicate that as
the client’s integrity is manipulated upward, the mean and median of the integrity
inference made by the respondent also moves upward. Both figures indicate that there is a
larger spread of inferences for the middle level of the manipulated variable. In addition,
the boxplots indicate that there are outlying observations, a total of three: one observation
where the value of CUE is -1 and INFER1 is 5, and two observations where the value of
CUE is 1 and INFER2 is 2. Subsequent statistical tests are conducted both with these
three observations included and with them omitted. The results with the omitted outliers
are reported only if there is a significant difference in the test results.
4.2.2. Correlation of Integrity Manipulation and Resulting Inference

The correlation between two variables indicates the degree to which two variables
move together; that is, as one increases, what happens to the other. While correlation is
not an indication of cause-and-effect, it is a measure of the strength of the relationship
between the variables. The Pearson correlation coefficient for CUE and INFER1
(integrity) is 0.417 (p-value <0.0001), and the Pearson correlation coefficient for CUE
and INFER2 (integrity traits) is 0.442 (p-value <0.0001).26 The positive coefficient
indicates that the variables have a direct relationship (i.e., they move in the same
direction). That is, as the manipulation CUE goes from low to high integrity, the
respondents inference about the client’s integrity also increases. The statistical
significance (p-values) indicates that statistically, a correlation exists; however, the low
coefficient depicts a weak association.
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The Pearson correlation coefficient for CUE and INFER3 is 0.254 (p-value
<0.0030). The integrity manipulation represented by CUE, was not intended to
manipulate the respondents inference about the client’s intelligence (measured by
INFER3). The correlation shows a very weak but statistically significant correlation
between CUE and INFER3.
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INFER1 is the subjects’ response to the statement about to integrity.

Figure 2. Side-by-side boxplots of INFER1 by the manipulated variable CUE
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4.2.3. Analysis of Variance between Manipulation Levels

To determine if the manipulation (CUE) had an effect on the respondents’ mean
inferences about the client’s integrity (INFER1 and INFER2) and intelligence (INFER3),
a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) test was used. Like ANOVA, MANOVA
is used to test whether the dependent means of the subsamples (divided on the
independent variable CUE) are significantly different. In the case of MANOVA, the
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INFER2 is the average of the four subject responses to the statements related to integrity: integrity,
candid, responsible, and self-serving. (Because it is a negative characteristic, the self-serving variable
is reversed.)

Figure 3. Side-by-side boxplots of INFER2 by the manipulated variable CUE
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dependent means are represented by vectors composed of three dependent variables:
INFER1, INFER2, and INFER3. The Wilks’ Lambda test statistic for this MANOVA test
has a value of 0.755 (F-value = 6.49 and p-value <0.0001). This test offers strong
statistical evidence that the mean vectors are significantly different among manipulated
levels of the variable CUE.
Three separate ANOVA tests were used to investigate the effect that CUE has on
each of the three inference variables separately. The first ANOVA was used to answer
the question “Did the manipulation have an effect on the respondents’ mean answers to
‘Chris Conaway seems to have integrity,’” which was coded as INFER1 and had an
average response of 3.17 on a six-point scale (where six is strongly agree). When the
sample was divided by the manipulated integrity variable (CUE) as shown in Table 8
Panel B, the responses were 3.81 for the high integrity, 3.17 for medium integrity, and
2.72 for low integrity. The ANOVA test shown in Table 9 revealed that the effect of CUE
is significant (F Value = 14.00 with a p-value less than 0.0001). The manipulation was
successful in effecting the respondents’ mean impression of the client’s integrity when
the CUE revealed higher (lower) integrity.
The second ANOVA was used to answer the question “Did the manipulation have
an effect on the respondents’ mean answers to the four integrity-characteristic statements
(integrity, candid, responsible, self-serving).” The responses were averaged to create the
variable INFER2 (with the negative characteristic, self-serving, being reversed). The
average response was 3.20 on a six-point scale (where six is strongly agree). When the
sample was divided by the manipulated variable, the responses were 3.81 for the high
integrity, 3.09 for medium integrity, and 2.86 for low integrity. The ANOVA test
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Table 9. ANOVA tests of the manipulation: The effect of CUE on INFER
Degrees of
Sum of
Mean
Variablesa Source
Freedom
Squares
Square
F Value
Pr > F
INFER1
Model
2
25.31
12.65
14.00
<0.0001
Error
131
118.39
0.90

INFER2

Model
Error

2
131

20.15
73.50

10.07
0.56

17.95

<0.0001

INFER3

Model
Error

2
131

4.39
57.63

2.20
0.44

4.99

0.0081

a

INFER1 is the response to the statement about to integrity.
INFER2 is the average to the four response to the statements related to integrity: integrity, candid,
responsible, and self-serving. (Because it is a negative characteristic, the self-serving variable is
reversed.)
INFER3 is the average of the remaining two characteristics not related to integrity: well-informed and
unintelligent. (Unintelligent is reversed.)

revealed that the effect of CUE is significant (F Value = 17.95 with a p-value less than
0.0001). The manipulation was successful in effecting the respondents’ impression of the
client’s integrity characteristics when the CUE revealed higher (lower) integrity.
The third ANOVA tested the effect of the manipulation on the two traits not
related to integrity; these two statements were related to the intelligence of Conaway:
informed and unintelligent (reversed for analysis). The average response from these two
statements is denoted as INFER3, which had a mean response of 4.04. When the sample
was divided by the manipulated variable, the responses were 4.32 for the high integrity,
3.99 for medium integrity, and 3.88 for low integrity. The ANOVA test revealed that the
effect of CUE is significant (F Value = 4.99 with a p-value less than 0.0081). If CUE
made an inference only about integrity, INFER3 shouldn’t be significant at all. However,
the significance of this variable could be due to an overall positive or negative impression
of Conaway.
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4.2.4. T-test of Manipulation Directionality

Individual t-tests were conducted to determine if the directionality (as depicted in
Figure 4) represents a significant difference between the auditors’ inference of client
integrity variables (INFER) at the various levels of the integrity variable (CUE). For each
of the three inference variables, three t-tests were conducted to compare high to medium
integrity, medium to low integrity, and high integrity to low integrity. The results of the
nine t-tests are presented in Table 10.

Auditor's Means Assessed Integrity
of Client (INFER)

5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
INFER1
INFER2

Low

Medium

High

Client Integrity (CUE)

INFER3

Figure 4. The effect of integrity on auditor’s mean inference of integrity
Table 10. Directionality of assessed integrity between levels of integrity (CUE)
Medium to Low
High to Medium
High to Low
Risk of H:INFERM–INFERL
H:INFERH–INFERM
H:INFERH–INFERL
Fraud
>0
>0
>0
Variable t-statistic p-value
t-statistic p-value
t-statistic p-value
INFER1
2.27
0.0256
2.95
0.0042
5.72
<0.0001
INFER2
1.53
0.1293
4.28
<0.0001
5.92
<0.0001
INFER3
0.78
0.4387
2.29
0.0247
3.27
0.0016
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As expected from the results of the ANOVA tests presented in Table 9, many of
the differences were significant and in the expected direction (i.e., as CUE increased, so
did INFER). For all the inference variables the difference between the respondents’ mean
inference was significantly different between the high and low manipulated integrity
levels of the variable CUE. Also, for all three inference variables, the difference between
the respondents’ mean inference was significantly different between the high and
medium manipulated levels of integrity. However, the difference between the medium
and low manipulated levels of integrity was only significant for the variable INFER1.
The significance and directional differences of INFER1 between all three levels of CUE
indicates that the manipulation was successful in influencing the respondents’ impression
about the client’s integrity.
4.3. Tests of Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 (the alternative form) states that when assessing the risk of
management fraud, internal auditors will assess the risk of fraud higher, the lower the
client’s integrity. For this hypothesis to be accepted, the variable CUE, the manipulated
variable about the client’s integrity, will have a significant impact on the internal
auditor’s (respondent’s) assessed risk of fraud.
4.3.1. Assessed Risk of Fraud, the Dependent Variable

Three measures of the auditor’s risk of fraud were made in the research
instrument. RF1 is feasibility that fraud by Conaway is an explanation (one of seven) for
a change in an analytic. The assessment was made by marking one of 51 circles, the
farther to the right indicating more feasibility. The variable is scaled between zero and
one (see formula 3).
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The mean assessment for RF1 was 0.570, and is presented in Table 11 Panel A
along with the variable’s standard deviation. In addition, Table 10 Panel B also presents
the means of sub-samples when the variable is subdivided by the integrity cue given in
the research instrument. A side-by-side boxplot of these sub-samples is presented in
Figure 5. Visually, it appears that as integrity (CUE) goes up, the mean assessed risk of
fraud (RF1) decreases as predicted. However, the interquartile range for the third subsample (CUE=1) depicts less of a consensus by the respondents. The boxplots offer
evidence of one outlier: CUE = –1 and RF1 = 0.05. Subsequent statistical tests using RF1
as the dependent variable are conducted both with this observation included and with it
omitted. The results with the omitted outlier are reported only if there is a difference in
the test conclusions.
RF2 is the difference in feasibility that fraud was committed by Conaway and that
fraud was committed by Alexander (the CEO of the parent company). Because there was
no evidence about Alexander’s integrity, the difference can be attributed (at least in part)
to the integrity cue given about Conaway. This variable is also scaled between zero and
one; the mean assessment for RF2 was 0.158. Because it is greater than zero, on average
Table 11. Risk of fraud measurements
Panel A: Mean responses to risk of fraud measurements
Variablesa
Mean
Std Dev
Minimum Maximum
RF1
0.570
0.240
0.000
1.000
RF2
0.158
0.271
–0.360
0.900
RF3
0.252
0.205
0.000
0.800
Panel B: Mean responses to risk of fraud measurements by integrity cue subgroups
CUE = High
CUE = Medium
CUE = Low
Variables
Mean
Std Dev
Mean
Std Dev
Mean
Std Dev
RF1
0.526
0.277
0.531
0.235
0.640
0.214
RF2
0.162
0.275
0.134
0.233
0.178
0.304
RF3
0.229
0.195
0.203
0.187
0.315
0.215
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RF1 is the response variable that represents the feasibility that fraud on the part of Conaway is the
reason for the reduction in maintenance expenses relative to sales.

Figure 5. Side-by-side boxplots of RF1 by the manipulated variable CUE

the respondents believed it was more feasible that Conaway (as opposed to Alexander)
committed fraud to change the analytic. This data is presented in Table 11, and a side-byside boxplot of these sub-samples is presented in Figure 6. Visually, it appears that as
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integrity (CUE) goes up, the mean assessed risk of fraud (RF2) is virtually unchanged. In
addition, the boxplots offer evidence of one outlier: where CUE = 0 and RF2=.84.
Subsequent statistical tests using RF2 as the dependent variable are conducted both with
this observation included and with it omitted. The results with the omitted outlier are
reported only if there is a difference in the test conclusions.
RF3 is the assessed probability that fraud was the reason for the change in
analytic. This assessment was made by distributing 100 points among four possible
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RF2 is the response variable that represents the difference in feasibility between fraud on the part of
Conaway and fraud on the part of Alexander as the reason for the reduction in maintenance expenses
relative to sales.

Figure 6. Side-by-side boxplots of RF2 by the manipulated variable CUE
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explanatory factors, one of which was intentional misstatement (fraud). RF3 is scaled
between zero and one by taking the points assigned to fraud and dividing by 100. The
mean assessment was 0.252. This data is presented in Table 11, and a side-by-side
boxplot of these sub-samples is presented in Figure 7. Visually, it appears that as integrity
(CUE) goes up, the mean assessed risk of fraud (RF3) does not follow the expected
pattern (decreasing). The decrease is obvious from the low-integrity case (CUE = –1) to
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RF3 is the response variable that represents the difference in probability that fraud is the reason for the
reduction in maintenance expenses relative to sales.

Figure 7. Side-by-side boxplots of RF3 by the manipulated variable CUE
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the other two levels; however, the expected decrease in RF3 from medium integrity (CUE
= 0) to high integrity (CUE = 1) is not seen. This boxplot offers evidence of one outlier:
CUE = 1 and RF3 = .75. Subsequent statistical tests using RF3 as the dependent variable
are conducted both with this observation included and with it omitted. The results with
the omitted outlier are reported only if there is a significant difference in the test results.
4.3.2. Analysis of Variance of Fraud Risk Assessment between Integrity Levels

A MANOVA test was conducted to test hypothesis 1 (null form): the effect of
client’s integrity (CUE) has no effect on the auditor’s assessed risk of fraud (RF1, RF2,
and RF3). The Wilks’ Lambda test statistic for this MANOVA test has a value of 0.913
(F-value = 1.99 and p-value 0.0669). However, when the three outliers (described in
section 4.3.1.) are omitted from this MANOVA test, the Wilks’ Lambda test statistic
becomes 0.891 (F-value = 2.52 and p-value of 0.0219), which offers evidence that the
mean vectors of the three dependent variables are significantly different among the
manipulated levels of the variable CUE. This evidence supports rejecting the null version
of hypothesis 1 in favor of the alternative, that CUE has an effect on the auditors’ means
assessed risk of fraud.
Three separate ANOVA tests were used to investigate the effect that CUE has on
each of the three risk assessment variables (RF1, RF2, and RF3) separately. Table 12
presents the results of these three ANOVA tests. The three ANOVA tests were repeated
with the three outliers (described in section 4.3.1.) omitted, but the results of the tests
were not significantly changed.
ANOVA tests the difference in the subsample means of the risk assessment
variables that were divided by the variable CUE. ANOVA is used to answer the question,

65

Table 12. The effect of integrity (CUE) on assessed risk of fraud (ANOVA results)
Degrees of
Sum of
Mean
Variables Source
Freedom
Squares
Square
F Value
Pr > F
RF1
Model
2
0.384
0.192
3.33
0.039
Error
131
7.539
0.057

RF2

Model
Error

2
131

0.047
9.755

0.023
0.074

0.31

0.736

RF3

Model
Error

2
131

0.329
5.261

0.164
0.040

4.09

0.019

“Are the means of the means of the subsamples from the same population?” The results
of these tests indicate that the subsample means of RF1 and RF3 are significantly
different (from different populations). However, these results are not seen for the variable
RF2. These three ANOVA tests offer mixed evidence about hypothesis 1, but in general
support the rejecting the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative.
4.3.3. Directionality of Mean Assessed Risk of Fraud between Integrity Levels

For hypothesis 1 to be supported, as client’s integrity is increased, the auditors’
assessed risk of fraud would be decreased, but this is not the case. As depicted in Figure 8
and in Table 11, assessed risk of fraud is decreased as integrity goes from low to medium
for all three risk assessment variables, which is expected. However the risk of fraud is
slightly increased as integrity goes from medium to high in some cases. For each of the
three risk assessment variables, three individual t-tests were conducted to compare low
integrity to medium integrity, medium integrity to high integrity, and low integrity to
high integrity. The results of the nine t-tests are presented in Table 13.
As Figure 8 depicts, the t-tests reveal that for RF1 and RF3, the mean assessed
risks of fraud were significantly high for low integrity compared to medium integrity and
for low integrity compared to high integrity. The change in the mean assessed risks of
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Auditor's Assessed Mean
Risk of Fraud (RF)
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Figure 8. The effect of integrity on auditor’s assess risk of fraud
Table 13. Directionality of risk of fraud (RF) between levels of integrity (CUE)
Low to Medium
Medium to High
Low to High
Risk of
H: RFL–RFM>0
Fraud
H: RFM–RFH>0
H: RFL–RFH>0
Variable t-statistic p-value
t-statistic p-value
t-statistic p-value
RF1
2.38
0.0192
0.08
0.9349
2.15
0.0344
RF2
0.78
0.4369
–0.49
0.6261
0.25
0.8015
RF3
2.71
0.0079
–0.61
0.5413
1.91
0.0591

fraud (RF1 and RF3) were not significantly different from the medium to high levels of
integrity. None of the means were significantly different for the variable RF2, as
expected given the ANOVA results. These results seem to indicate that auditors found the
low-integrity cue (defined by tardiness, absenteeism, and deception) an indicator of lower
integrity leading to a potential for fraud. The auditors did not find the medium-integrity
cue (defined by tardiness and absenteeism) or the high-integrity cue (defined by telling
the truth even if it meant losing a charitable donation) significantly different indicators of
the client’s integrity with respect to a potential for fraud.
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4.4. Tests of Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 1 tested the main effect of the client’s integrity (CUE) on the auditors’
mean assessed risk of fraud (RF). Hypothesis 2, tests the interaction effect of client’s
integrity (CUE) with the auditor’s implicit theory of integrity (IT) on the auditors’ mean
assessed risk of fraud (RF). Hypothesis 2 (alternative form) states that when assessing the
risk of management fraud, internal auditors who are entity theorists of integrity will
weight the moral inferences of the client’s integrity more heavily than those who are
incremental theorists of integrity, versus the null of no interaction effect.
An auditor’s implicit theory of integrity identifies the auditor as an entity theorist
or an incremental theorist; entity theorists are theoretically more likely to use an integrity
cue to predict future behavior than are incremental theorist. Hypothesis 2 predicts that
entity-theorist auditors’ mean assessed risk of fraud will be more extreme than that of the
incremental-theorist auditors. Each respondent (auditor) is identified as an entity theorists
or incremental theorist by the variable IT1, a dichotomous variable that is coded zero for
incremental theorists and one for entity theorists. For each respondent, there are three
measures of the assessed risk of fraud (RF1, RF2, and RF3). The mean response for each
of the three risk-of-fraud variables is presented in Table 14. Graphs of these means are
presented in three separate graphs in Figure 9. In addition to the overall mean, mean
responses are presented for each of the six cells defined by the auditor’s implicit theory
(IT1; entity or incremental) and the integrity cue (CUE; high, medium or low).
To test hypothesis 2, the models specified in formula (5) and formula (6) are used.
In both cases the effect of interest for hypothesis 2 is the interaction effect on the
auditor’s assessed risk of fraud. There are three measures of the risk of fraud (RF1, RF2,
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Table 14. Mean assessed risk of fraud by cell (CUE×IT1)
Panel A: Assessed risk of fraud (RF1)
Implicit Theory
Client Integrity (CUE)
(IT1)
High
Medium
Low
Entity
0.618
0.539
0.648
Incremental
0.449
0.523
0.626
Totals
0.526
0.531
0.640

Totals
0.605
0.529
0.570

Panel B: Assessed risk of fraud (RF2)

Implicit Theory
(IT1)

Entity
Incremental
Totals

High
0.191
0.137
0.162

Client Integrity (CUE)
Medium
Low
0.104
0.179
0.166
0.176
0.134
0.178

Totals
0.157
0.159
0.158

Client Integrity (CUE)
Medium
Low
0.240
0.302
0.165
0.338
0.203
0.315

Totals
0.267
0.234
0.252

Panel C: Assessed risk of fraud (RF3)

Implicit Theory
(IT1)

Entity
Incremental
Totals

High
0.240
0.220
0.229

and RF3; see section 4.3.1.) and two measures of the implicit theory (IT1 and IT2; see
section 3.3.1.1.), resulting in a need for two types of tests of hypothesis 2: those with the
dichotomous version and those with the continuous measure of the implicit theory. The
results of theses tests are presented in the following two sections based on the
measurement of IT used.
4.4.1. Tests of Hypothesis 2 with a Dichotomous Measure of Implicit Theory

A MANOVA test was conducted to test whether the hypothesis 2 model (see
equation 5), which created a six-cell design, resulted in significantly different mean
vectors (made of RF1, RF2, and RF3) between cells. The Wilks’ Lambda test statistic for
this MANOVA test has a value of 0.919 (F-value = 1.83 and p-value 0.0942). However,
when the three outliers (described in section 4.3.1.) are omitted from this MANOVA test,
the Wilks’ Lambda test statistic becomes 0.889 (F-value = 2.53 and p-value of 0.0213),
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Figure 9. The main and interaction effect of CUE and IT2 on assess risk of fraud
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which offers evidence that the mean vectors of the three dependent variables are
significantly different among the six cells defined by the interaction of CUE and IT1.
Three individual ANOVA tests were conducted to assess the significance of the
interaction of implicit theory (IT1) and client’s integrity (CUE) on the individual assessed
risks of fraud. The results of these ANOVA tests are presented in Table 15, Panel A.
These individual ANOVA tests reveal that the model (main and interaction effects of
CUE and IT1) is responsible for different cell means in two of the assessed risk of fraud,
measures RF1 and RF3, but not for RF2.
Panel B of Table 15 shows the individual F values that test the effect of the
independent variables on the cell mean differences. In all three ANOVA tests, the
interaction of CUE and IT1 does not have a significant effect on the assessed risk of
fraud. These nonsignificant results do not support an interaction effect.
Table 15. The main and interaction effects of CUE and IT1 on assessed risk of fraud
Panel A: ANOVA Results
Degrees of
Sum of
Mean
Variables Source
Freedom
Squares
Square
F Value
Pr > F
RF1
Model
2
0.384
0.192
3.33
0.039
Error
131
7.539
0.057

RF2

Model
Error

2
131

0.047
9.755

0.023
0.074

0.31

0.736

RF3

Model
Error

2
131

0.329
5.261

0.164
0.040

4.09

0.019

Panel B: ANOVA tests of independent variables
Independent Variables
CUE
Dependent
IT1
Variables
F Value
Pr > F
F Value
Pr > F
RF1
3.38
0.0370
2.17
0.1434
RF2
0.30
0.7394
0.02
0.8996
RF3
4.06
0.0195
0.31
0.5788
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CUE×IT2
F Value
Pr > F
1.78
0.1844
0.13
0.7236
0.52
0.4722

4.4.2. Tests of Hypothesis 2 with a Continuous Measure of Implicit Theory

The rule used to assign respondents to entity or incremental theorists is as
follows: the responses (on a six-point scale) to three statements regarding integrity are
averaged; if the average is greater than 3.5 (indicating general agreement that integrity is
a fixed characteristic) the respondent is an entity theorist, and an average of less than 3.5
(indicating general disagreement) makes the respondent an incremental theorist. Using
that rule, a respondent with an average score of four (somewhat agree) would be an entity
theorist just like a respondent with an average score of six (strongly agree). Theoretically,
an entity theorist with an average score of six would weight the integrity cue more than
the entity theorist with a score of four. In other words, the implicit theory variable might
be more descriptive if it were a continuous variable (represented as IT2) as opposed to a
dichotomous variable (IT1). A frequency distribution of IT2 is shown in Figure 10.
A multivariate multiple regression test was conducted to test hypothesis 2 (null
form): the effect of the interaction of client’s integrity (CUE) and the auditor’s implicit
theory (IT2) has no effect on the auditor’s assessed risk of fraud (RF1, RF2, and RF3).
20
Incremental Theorist

Frequency

15

Entity Theorist

10
5
0
1.00 1.33 1.67 2.00 2.33 2.70 3.00 3.33 3.67 4.00 4.33 4.67 5.00 5.33 5.67 6.00

Implicit Theory (IT2)
Figure 10. Frequency distribution of implicit theory responses (IT2)
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The model specified in formula (6) was used, where RF is a matrix of the three RF
variables, RF1, RF2, and RF3. The Wilks’ Lambda test statistic for this multivariate
regression test has a value of 0.883 (F-value = 1.80 and p-value 0.0677). However, when
the three outliers (described in section 4.3.1.) are omitted from this test, the Wilks’
Lambda test statistic becomes 0.866 (F-value = 2.05 and p-value of 0.0337), which offers
evidence that the model is a significant determinant of the three dependent variables.
Three regression analyses, one each per dependent variable, was conducted to
assess the significance of the interaction model and its components on the dependent
variable. The results of these regressions are presented in Table 16. For hypothesis 2 (null
form) to be rejected in favor of the alternative, the interaction would have to yield a β3
significantly less than zero. β3 is not significant in any of the three regressions. There is
no evidence to support rejecting the null hypothesis of no interaction effect. After
removing the outliers (see section 4.3.1.), the results were virtually unchanged. However,
for the dependent variable RF1, the p-value on the interaction decreased to 0.0598 for a
parameter estimate of 0.041.
Table 16. The effect of integrity and implicit theory (IT2) on assessed risk of fraud
RF = β 0 + β1CUE + β 2 IT2 + β 3CUE × IT2
Independent Dep. Variable = RF1
Dep. Variable = RF2
Dep. Variable = RF3
Variables
β Estimate p-value
β Estimate p-value β Estimate p-value
0.417
<0.0001
0.085
0.2710
0.152
0.0082
Intercept β0
–0.172
0.0453
–0.108
0.2732 –0.073
0.3146
CUE
β1
0.043
0.0177
0.021
0.3066
0.027
0.0743
IT2
β2
0.033
0.1361
0.028
0.2801
0.009
0.6241
CUE*IT2 β3

R2

0.0897

0.0165
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0.0554

4.5. Tests of Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 (alternative form) states that entity-theorist auditor will request more
additional character information than will incremental-theorist auditors. Given a space to
request six additional pieces of information respondents requested between zero and six.
These requests were coded as being related to character information of Conaway or
related to the incentive bonus Conaway stood to receive. The portion of character
information was calculated as the number of character-information requests divided by
the total number of requests and coded as the variable CINFO, a continuous variable
between zero and one. A similar computation was made to create the variable related to
bonus information, BINFO, a continuous variable between zero and one. The mean
responses for these variables are presented in Table 17; in addition, the means of
subgroups (distinguished by the respondents’ implicit theory, IT1, and the level of the
integrity cue received, CUE) are also presented.
4.5.1. Tests of Hypothesis 3 with a Dichotomous Measure of Implicit Theory

For hypothesis 3 (alternative form) to be supported, the mean additional
information requested by the entity theorists must be significantly greater than the mean
Table 17. Mean additional information requested by type
Panel A: Portion of additional information requested related to character (CINFO)
Client Integrity (CUE)
High
Medium
Low
Totals
0.071
0.049
0.047
Implicit Theory Entity
0.053
Incremental
0.113
0.120
0.042
(IT1)
0.094
Totals
0.093
0.084
0.045
0.072
Panel B: Portion of additional information requested related to bonus (BINFO)
Client Integrity (CUE)
High
Medium
Low
Totals
0.073
0.073
0.052
Implicit Theory Entity
0.064
Incremental
0.018
0.036
0.032
(IT1)
0.029
Totals
0.043
0.055
0.045
0.048
74

information requested by the incremental theorists. Two t-tests were used to make this
determination.
The first t-test tests the alternative hypothesis that character information requested
by entity theorists is greater than character information requested by incremental theorists
(CINFOET>CINFOIT). The difference in the group means of CINFO is 0.041, with the
CINFOIT being larger than CINFOET; it appears from the means themselves that this
hypothesis will be rejected. The test statistic (using pooled variance) has a value of –1.54
and a p-value of 0.1268, which does not support rejecting the null hypothesis.
The second t-test tests the alternative hypothesis that the bonus information
requested by entity theorists is greater than the bonus information requested by
incremental theorists (BINFOET>BINFOIT). The difference in the group means of BINFO
is 0.035, with the BINFOET being larger than BINFOIT. The test statistic (using pooled
variance) has a value of 1.88 and a p-value of 0.0625, which does not support rejecting
the null hypothesis.
4.5.2. Tests of Hypothesis 3 with a Continuous Measure of Implicit Theory

As stated earlier, the dichotomous variable used to describe the implicit theory
(IT1) may fail to capture differences between two respondents categorized as an entity
(or incremental) theorists who have a difference in their continuous implicit theory score
(IT2). Therefore, the tests of hypothesis 3 were rerun using the continuous version of the
independent variable. Two regressions analyses were conducted to examine the effects of
implicit theory (IT2) on types of additional information requested (CINFO and BINFO)
using the following model:
INFO = β 0 + β1IT2 + e .

(7)
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For hypothesis 3 (alternative form) to be supported, as IT2 increases (as the respondent
moves toward an entity theorist), the additional information requested related to character
or bonus should also increase. In other words β1 should be positive.
The results of these two tests are presented in Table 18. There was no evidence to
support the hypothesis that implicit theory (IT2) would have an effect on the amount of
character information requested (CINFO); the value of β1 is –0.012 with a p-value of
0.2766. Nor is there significant evidence to support the hypothesis that implicit theory
(IT2) would have an effect on the amount of bonus information requested (BINFO); the
value of β1 is 0.015 with a p-value of 0.0585.
4.5.3. A Possible Interaction Affecting the Results of Hypothesis 3

Though there is no theory to support it, it is possible that the integrity of the client
(CUE) could have a main effect or interaction effect (IT2×CUE) on the quantity and type
of information requested (CINFO and BINFO). To examine the possibility of such an
effect, two regression test were conducted using the following model:
INFO = β 0 + β1IT 2 + β 2 CUE + β 3 CUE × IT2 + e .

(8)

The main effect of CUE is represented by β2 and the interaction with IT2 is represented
by β3. If β2 or β3 is significantly different from zero, CUE or the interaction effect of
Table 18. The effect of the implicit theory (IT2) on information requested
INFO = β 0 + β1IT2
Independent Dep. Variable = BINFO Dep. Variable = CINFO
Variable
p-value
p-value
β Estimate
β Estimate
–0.005
0.8564
0.117
0.0076
Intercept β0
0.015
0.0585
–0.012
0.2766
IT2
β1

R2

0.0271

0.0090
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CUE×IT2 is significant. Because there is no supporting theory, no prediction is made
about the significance or direction of these two parameters. The results of these
regressions are presented in Table 19. Neither β2 nor β3 are significant, offering no
evidence that client integrity (CUE) or its interaction with auditors’ implicit theory
(CUE×IT2) has an effect on the quantity or type of additional information requested.
4.6. Tests for Order Effects

Regression analysis was used to determine whether the order of questions in a
particular task had an effect on the variable measured from that task. For the most part,
each research instrument had a different, randomized order of questions in each task to
avoid the effects of order. See Appendix B for a complete description of randomization.
No order of questions was found to have a significant effect on the responses. A list of all
the tests run and their significance is presented in Table 20.
4.7. Alternative Tests of Hypotheses

The planned tests described in sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, essentially yielded mixed
or no evidence in support of the three hypotheses. This research project investigates the
effect of two independent variables on the auditors’ assessed risk of management fraud.
The first independent variable is the auditors’ implicit theory, a personal characteristic
Table 19. The effect of the implicit theory and integrity on information requested
INFO = β 0 + β1IT 2 + β 2 CUE + β 3 CUE × IT2
Independent Dep. Variable = BINFO Dep. Variable = CINFO
Variable
p-value
p-value
β Estimate
β Estimate
–0.007
0.8184
0.114
0.0097
Intercept β0
0.016
0.0531
–0.011
0.3221
IT2
β1
–0.012
0.7702
0.090
0.1053
CUE
β2
0.004
0.6840
–0.018
0.2101
CUE×IT2 β3

R2

0.0291

0.0358

77

Table 20. Tests for order effects

a

b

Task
1
1
2A
2A
2B
2C
2C

Variable a
IT2
IT2
RF1
RF2
RF3
INFER1
INFER2

Was order effected by
Order of question in Task 1
Order of three questions of interest in Task 1
Order of questions in Task 2A
Order of questions in Task 2A
Order of questions in Task 2B
Order of questions in Task 2C
Order of questions in Task 2C

Test
Statisticb
0.43
1.14
1.20
0.22
1.12
–1.13
–0.72

p-value
0.6683
0.2577
0.2338
0.8256
0.2282
0.2607
0.4753

Some variables were not tested for order effects for the following reasons: (1) the variable is a
manipulation of another variable (e.g., IT1 is a manipulation of IT2), or (2) the variable resulted from a
response not effected by question order (e.g., CINOF, BINFO).
Test statistic is the t-value for the used to evaluate the significance of the parameter estimate for the
variable used to represent order.

that cannot be manipulated by the researcher. The second independent variable is client
integrity, manipulated by the three-level variable CUE (high, medium and low).
As a check of this manipulation, the auditor demonstrates his/her own assessment
of the client’s integrity, which is coded as the variable INFER1. The tests of hypotheses 1
and 2 were repeated using INFER127 in place of the manipulated variable CUE. The
results of these additional tests are discussed in the following sections. No retest is made
of hypothesis 3 because it does not address client integrity as an explanatory variable.
4.7.1. Retest of Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 (alternative form) states that when assessing the risk of management
fraud, internal auditors will assess the risk of fraud higher, the lower the client’s integrity.
A multivariate multiple regression test was conducted to retest hypothesis 1 (null form):
the auditor’s assessment of client’s integrity (INFER1) has no effect on the auditor’s
assessed risk of fraud (RF1, RF2, and RF3). The following model was used:
RF = β 0 + β1INFER1 + e ,

(9)
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where RF is a vector of the three risk of fraud variables, RF1, RF2, and RF3. The Wilks’
Lambda test statistic for this multivariate regression test has a value of 0.908 (F-value =
4.380 and p-value 0.0057), which offers evidence that the model is a significant
determinant of the three dependent variables.
Three regression analyses, one each per dependent variable, was conducted to
assess the significance of the INFER1 on the dependent variable. To support hypothesis
1, the value of β1 should be less than zero, which would indicate that as client integrity
goes down, the risk of fraud increases. The results of these three regressions, presented in
Table 21, show that β1 is negative and significant in all three models. These tests offer
strong evidence for rejecting null hypothesis 1 in favor of the alternative: the higher
client’s integrity, the lower the auditor’s assessed risk of fraud. However, in this case, the
hypothesis must be restated as “the higher the auditor’s assessment of client integrity, the
lower the auditor’s assessed risk of fraud.”
4.7.2. Retest of Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2 expands the prediction about hypothesis 1 to include the auditor’s
implicit theory of integrity and its interaction with assessment of client integrity as a
predictor of the risk of fraud. Specifically, hypothesis 2 states that when assessing the risk
of management fraud, internal auditors who are entity theorists of integrity will weight
Table 21. The effect of integrity (INFER1) on assessed risk of fraud (RF)
RF = β 0 + β1INFER1
Independent Dep. Variable = RF1
Dep. Variable = RF2
Dep. Variable = RF3
Variables
β Estimate p-value
β Estimate p-value β Estimate p-value
0.781
<0.0001
0.305
<0.0001
0.389
<0.0001
Intercept β0
–0.066
0.0010
–0.046
0.0404 –0.043
0.0111
INFER1 β1

R2

0.0794

0.0314
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0.0478

the moral inferences of the client’s integrity more heavily than those who are incremental
theorists of integrity. To retest this hypothesis, the manipulated integrity variable CUE is
replaced with the auditor’s inference of client integrity (INFER1).
A multivariate multiple regression test was conducted to retest hypothesis 1 (null
form): the interaction of the client’s integrity as assessed by the auditor (INFER1) and the
auditor’s implicit theory (IT2) has no effect on the auditor’s assessed risk of fraud (RF1,
RF2, and RF3). The following model was used:
RF = β 0 + β1INFER1 + β 2 IT2 + β 3 INFER1× IT2 + e ,

(10)

where RF is a vector of the three risk of fraud variables, RF1, RF2, and RF3. The Wilks’
Lambda test statistic for this multivariate regression test has a value of 0.849 (F-value =
2.40 and p-value 0.0123), indicating that the model with the interaction term is a
significant determinate of the three risk of fraud assessments.
Three regression analyses, one each per dependent variable, was conducted to
assess the significance of the interaction of INFER1 and IT2 on the dependent variables.
Applying the implicit theory, the higher the value of IT2 (leaning more toward an entity
theorist), the more extreme and negative the effect on risk of fraud; in other words, the
prediction is that β3 should be less than zero. In three regressions (using the three
measure of risk of fraud as dependent variables), β3 was not significant, offering no
additional evidence that would support rejecting the null version of hypothesis 2.
4.8. End Notes

22 Each of the six chapters had a separate lottery. The lottery prize was a gift certificate
valued between $75 and $100 to local restaurants or online retailers. Respondents
were informed that if a minimum number of people (based on a percentage of
membership) responded from their chapter, a drawing would be held to award one
certificate to one of the respondents. Of the six chapters, only one met the minimum
number of respondents and resulted in the awarding of a prize.
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23 Many companies have policies and physical controls (firewalls) against downloading
executable files. The Excel version of the research instrument contains macros, which
are small executable programs. The offer for a paper version was intended to give
respondents an alternative to downloading an executable file. In addition, anonymity
could be better preserved if the research instrument were returned in a postage-paid
envelope rather than via email, which contains identifying information.
24 Colbert (1989) reviews literature related to the effect of experience on auditors’
judgments. Though results are mixed, the general consensus of these 17 studies is that
auditor experience is a significant factor in complex and unstructured tasks, but not
significant in unstructured tasks. The same consensus does not apply to comparing
students to auditors, only more-experience to less-experienced auditors.
25 There are two implicit theory variables, IT1 and IT2. Because they use the same raw
data to construct the dichotomous and continuous variables, the effect of
demographics is investigated on IT2 only.
26 The Pearson correlation coefficients change to 0.457 for INFER1 and 0.476 for
INFER2 with the outliers omitted.
27 INFER1 (integrity inference only) was chosen as opposed to INFER 2 (inference
about four integrity characteristics averaged together) because the differences
between high and low, high and medium, and medium and low were all statistically
significant for INFER1. See section 4.2.4.
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5. CONCLUSION
5.1. Research Conclusions

The purpose of this research project was to determine how internal auditors would
use the cues provided about their client’s integrity. One of three integrity cues was
included in a narrative upon which the auditors based their answers to some planning
questions. The overall conclusions are presented below.
The first hypothesis tested whether the integrity cue had an effect on the auditor’s
assessment of management fraud risk. In this study, there was evidence to conclude that
integrity affects the auditors’ mean assessment of management fraud risk. In eight tests of
this hypothesis (one MANOVA, three ANOVA, one multivariate regression, and three
regressions), seven of the tests offered evidence for rejecting the null of no effect.
The first four tests of hypothesis 1 (section 4.3.2.) examined the effect of a threelevel manipulated integrity variable on the assessed risk of fraud. These test revealed that
the manipulation was successful in affecting the mean assessed fraud risk for two of the
three measures of risk of fraud. However subsequent t-tests for directionality (section
4.3.3.) showed that the expected directionality (the lower the integrity, the higher the
fraud risk) was only observed when comparing the low-integrity level to another level.
That is when comparing the medium-level to the high-level of integrity, the expected
effect was not found.28 From a practical standpoint, the auditor’s assessed risk of
management fraud averaged more than 10% higher when integrity was low as compared
to the other integrity-levels.29
Hypothesis 1 was retested using the auditor’s assessed level of integrity rather
than the cue level as the predicting variable. In the four statistical tests used for this retest,
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the auditor’s assessed level of integrity significantly affected the assessed risk of fraud
(all three measures). The retest of this hypothesis indicates that the integrity inferences
made by internal auditors are used to assess the risk of management fraud. From a
practical standpoint, the regression parameter indicates that as the auditors’ integrity
inference increased from one (lowest client integrity) to six (highest client integrity), the
risk of fraud droped between 21.5% and 33%.30
The second hypothesis tested whether the auditor’s implicit theory of integrity, a
personal conviction, interacts with the effect of client integrity on the auditor’s assessed
risk of fraud. The auditor’s implicit theory of integrity was modeled after Dweck and
Leggett (1988) and was measured using three questions about a person’s ability to change
his/her integrity characteristics. Theoretically, auditors who were scored as entity
theorists of integrity (as opposed to incremental theorists) would use the integrity cue to
predict future behavior. In other words, the entity theorists would expect future lowintegrity (high-integrity) behavior from a person who exhibited it in the past, while an
incremental theorist would not have an expectation of future behavior based on past
behavior.
Twelve statistical tests were used to test this hypothesis (one MANOVA, three
ANOVAs, two multivariate regressions, and six regressions), but no evidence was found
to support this hypothesis using the interaction of implicit theory and cue level, or during
the retest using the interaction of implicit theory and the auditor’s assessed level of client
integrity (see section 4.4.). Dweck and Leggett (1988) developed a general implicit
theory that other researchers (e.g., McConnell 2001; Gervey, Chiu, Hong, and Dweck
1999) have investigated as a mitigating effect on social judgments. In a sense, the
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auditors’ assessment of client integrity is a social judgment, and the effects found in this
prior research should be found in this project as well. Failure to find such results may be
a problem with the research design or lack of statistical power (see section 5.3.).
Alternatively, the judgment internal auditors make about client integrity may not be the
same as a social judgment. Instead, because auditors are trained professionals, their
judgments made about client integrity may not be biased by their personal convictions.
The third hypothesis tested whether the auditors’ implicit theory of integrity
affected the amount of additional information (bonus-related or character-related)
requested by the auditors. Theoretically, entity theorists would request more characterrelated information. Using t-tests to compare the mean information requested between
entity and incremental theorists (see section 4.5.), no strong evidence was found to
support this hypothesis. Marginally-significant evidence (a p-value just above the 0.05
level) was found in support of entity theorists requesting more bonus-related information;
however, the additional amount of evidence is negligible, and offers no practical
significance. Again, the lack of evidence may be an indication that an auditor’s training
prevents or lessens the effects of the auditor’s personal convictions in a professional
setting.
5.2. Potential Contributions and Suggestions for Future Research

This research was ultimately inconclusive because the research hypotheses related
to the implicit theory were not rejected in favor of the experimental null. However,
support of the first hypothesis, which duplicated the findings of Church, McMillan, and
Schneider (2001a and 2001b), sustains the idea that an auditor’s impression of the client’s
integrity does have an effect on the auditor’s assessment of management fraud risk.
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Future researchers may be interested in exploring how auditors seek out information
about client integrity and the degree to which the nature of that evidence affects the
auditor’s assessment of management fraud risk.
During the manipulation check of this project, there was no statistical difference
found between the medium and low levels of the manipulation, but the high level of
integrity was statistically higher than the other two. Future researchers may wish to
investigate how different observed client activity would cause the auditor’s integrity
inference to change. Such research could have a significant impact on guiding auditor
training and possibly future auditing standards related to client integrity.
This research project is an investigation of a personal characteristic of an auditor
and its effect on internal auditor’s assessment of management fraud risk. Though this
study is inconclusive, researchers may wish to continue research in this area by testing
the effects of other personal characteristics and convictions. This study introduces the
implicit theory (Dweck and Leggett 1988) into the body of accounting research. No
evidence is found to support a mitigating effect caused by the implicit theory of integrity,
but the lack of evidence about the effect is in conflict with findings from other disciplines
(e.g., Gervey, Chiu, Hong, and Dweck 1999 investigated the effects in a jury setting).
Future research into why the implicit theory has an effect in some settings but not in
accounting (or other settings) would be needed to explain this conflict.
Dweck and Leggett’s (1988) foundational research is based on the concept that
prior to any observation of cues, the observer has a preformed notion about whether a
particular trait is fixed (entity theorists) or variable (incremental theorist) within a given
person. McConnell (2001) investigated how entity theorists and incremental theorists
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respond to a series of integrity cues. Additional research is needed to determine whether
Dweck and Leggett’s implicit theory is a factor that affects how observers revise their
beliefs (as seen in Ashton and Ashton 1988 and Bamber 1983) as additional evidence is
received.
5.3. Potential Limitations

As with any research project, this study is subject to several limitations. Many of
these limitations are related to validity, which refers to the ability of the researcher to
measure what s/he thinks is being measured. These limitations are discussed in the
following subsections.
5.3.1. Lab Experiments and External Validity

This study is an experiment in which internal auditors are asked to use
information provided by the researcher to make the types of decisions that auditors make
in their everyday jobs. However, experiments are performed with a limited amount of
information (i.e., “in a laboratory”) as opposed to unlimited information (i.e., in the
whole world). The purpose of this researcher-imposed limitation is both practical (to limit
the extent of the research project and the time required to participate) and to hold
constant or eliminate as many variables as possible to more effectively study the
variables of interest.
Unfortunately, the laboratory environment is much smaller than the actual world
in which the auditor operates, so the researcher must be concerned about whether the
auditors’ responses are the same or similar to their real-world actions. If the researcher
cannot make that assumption, then the study is not generalizable beyond the scope of the
experiment, which is a threat to the study’s external or ecological validity.
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5.3.2. Subject Experience

The experiences of the subject prior to and during the completion of the research
instrument may have an effect on their responses. To a certain extent, the experiences of
the subjects are the key to drawing conclusions about how internal auditors behave.
However, the research instruments were completed by the subjects in a variety of
different settings over a four-month period of time.
Because the researcher was not in control of the local environment in which the
instrument was completed, disruptions, distractions, and other confounding elements
could have had an effect on the way a particular subject responded. In addition, the global
environment (e.g., world news, seasonal) may have changed during the four-month
period causing a larger set of information to be used by those subjects who responded
later. There is no measure of these environmental changes included in this study;
therefore, their effects cannot be measured.
5.3.3. Construct Validity versus Hypothesis-Guessing

This study is subject to concerns about construct validity, (i.e., the extent to which
variables capture the concept of interest). Construct validity is often a problem with
research involving subjects because the researcher does not want to directly ask the
question directly for fear of hypothesis-guessing. Hypothesis-guessing is the practice of
the subjects trying to determine how the researcher wants him/her to answer. The
Hawthorne Effect is a famous case in which workers were more productive, but the
researchers couldn’t determine whether the improvement was due to the improved
lighting (the variable of interest) or the presence of the researcher.
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Essentially, the researcher must find a balance between threats to construct
validity and hypothesis-guessing. “The problem of hypothesis-guessing can best be
avoided by making hypotheses hard to guess” (Cook and Campbell 1979, 66). Making
the hypothesis hard to guess is accomplished by asking questions indirectly. In this study
however, the questions are asked directly (e.g., the respondent is asked directly to assess
the risk of fraud). For that reason, there is limited threat to construct validity.
Unfortunately, because of the directness of the questions, this study is more
subject to hypothesis-guessing. To minimize the effects of hypothesis-guessing, most of
the questions of interest are included with other alternatives (distracters) that may lead
the respondents to believe that the research is about something else or about several
things, which hopefully takes the focus off the subject of management fraud. Therefore,
the variables, particularly the dependent variables (RF1, RF2, RF3, BINFO, and CINFO),
should be a good proxy for their intended construct.
5.3.4. Statistical Conclusion Validity

Because the tests of hypotheses 2 and 3 failed to result in a rejection of the null,
there is a question of whether the tests’ power was sufficient enough to reject the null
hypothesis. That is, was there an effect that these tests were not powerful enough to
detect? This question particularly applies to hypothesis 2, a 3×2 design resulting in six
cells, which creates a need for more observations than the other tests to maintain a
minimum level of power. The power of a study is influenced by the sample size. Using
the tables developed by Bratcher, Moran, and Zimmer (1970) and preliminary standard
deviation, a sample size of at least 18 observations per cell was needed to achieve a
power of .80, but due to discarded observations, one cell contained only 17 observations.
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Collection of additional responses may increase the power and allow smaller
effects to be detected that were not identified in this project. The tables of Bratcher,
Moran, and Zimmer (1970) were used to decide on the original sample size. With six
cells in the design and by setting alpha-risk at 0.05, power at 0.80, the needed sample size
of 18 observations per cell was found by using a ratio of ∆/σ (maximum mean difference
divided by standard deviation) of 1.25. The standard deviation was obtained from test
data. Using the actual standard deviation of the observations,31 27 observations per cell
would be needed to find a mean difference of approximately 0.25.
5.4. End Notes

28 The reason this expected effect was not found in hypothesis 1 may have revealed by
the manipulation check (sections 4.3.2. and 4.3.3.), which revealed that the
manipulated integrity variable was not completely successful in affecting the integrity
inference formed by the subjects.
29 The average difference of more than 10% was calculated using the two statistical test
that were statistically significant. It was calculated as the difference between the
mean assessed risk of fraud at the low level and the other two levels [((0.640–
0.526)+(0.640–0.531)+(0.315–0.229)+(0.315–0.203))÷4= 0.105].
30 The change in risk of fraud was calculated by multiplying the parameter estimate by
the difference between the low and high integrity inference (6–1=5):
•

For RF1, the feasibility of fraud as an explanation for change in analytic,
–0.066×5= –0.33 gap in risk of fraud between low and high integrity inference;

•

For RF2, the feasibility of fraud by Conaway as opposed to other members of
management, –0.046×5= –0.23 gap; and

•

For RF3, the probability of fraud as an explanation for change in analytic,
–0.043×5= –0.215 gap.

31 The standard deviations of the three dependent variables used in hypothesis 2 are
0.240 for RF1, 0.271 for RF2, and 0.205 for RF3.

89

REFERENCES

Abdolmohammadi, M. J., and V. D. Owhoso. 2000. Auditors’ ethical sensitivity and the
assessment of the likelihood of fraud. Managerial Finance 26, 11: 21–32.
AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) 1988a. Statements on
Auditing Standards No. 53, The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report
Errors and Irregularities. New York: AICPA.
AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) 1988b. Statements on
Auditing Standards No. 55, Consideration of the Internal Control Structure in a
Financial Statement Audit. New York: AICPA.
AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) 1996. Statements on
Auditing Standards No. 78, Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial
Statement Audit: An Amendment to Statement on Auditing Standards No 55. New
York: AIPCA.
AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) 1997. Statements on
Auditing Standards No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement
Audit. New York: AICPA.
AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) 1998. Codification of
Statements of Auditing Standards. New York: AICPA.
AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) 2001. AICPA Code of
Professional Conduct. http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/index.htm.
AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) 2002. Statements on
Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement
Audit. New York: AICPA.
Apostolou, B., J. M. Hassell, and S. A. Webber. 2000. Forensic expert classification of
management fraud risk factors. Journal of Forensic Accounting 1, 2: 181–191.
Apostolou, B., J. M Hassell, S. A. Webber, and G. E. Sumners. 2001. The relative
importance of management fraud risk factors. Behavioral Research in Accounting
13: 1–24.
Ashton, A. H., and R. H. Ashton. 1988. Sequential belief revision in auditing. The
Accounting Review 63, 4: 623–641.
Bamber, E. M. 1983. Expert judgment in the audit team: A source reliability approach.
Journal of Accounting Research 21, 2: 396–412.
Beaulieu, P. R. 2001. The effects of judgments of new clients’ integrity upon risk
judgments, audit evidence, and fees. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory
20, 2: 85–99.
90

Bedard, J. C., and L. E. Graham. 2002. The effects of decision aid orientation on risk
factor identification and audit test planning. Auditing: A Journal of Practice &
Theory 21, 2: 39–56.
Bierstaker, J. L., and S. Wright. 2001. A research note concerning practical problemsolving ability as a predictor of performance in auditing tasks. Behavioral
Research in Accounting 13: 49–62.
Bratcher, T. L., M. A. Moran, and W. J. Zimmer. 1970. Tables of sample sizes in the
analysis of variance. Journal of Quality Technology 2, 3: 156–164.
Chiu, C., C. S. Dweck, J. Y. Tong, and J. H. Fu. 1997. Implicit theories and conceptions
of morality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 73, 5: 923–940.
Chung, J., and G. S. Monroe. 2001. A research note on the effects of gender and task
complexity on an audit judgment. Behavioral Research in Accounting 13: 111–
125.
Church, B. K., J. J. McMillan, and A. Schneider. 1998. The effect of risk factors and
decision frame on internal auditors’ consideration of fraud explanations. Advances
in Accounting 16: 75–88.
Church, B. K., J. J. McMillan, and A. Schneider. 2001a. Detection of fraudulent financial
reporting. Journal of Accountancy 192, 3: 99.
Church, B. K., J. J. McMillan, and A. Schneider. 2001b. Factors affecting internal
auditors’ consideration of fraudulent financial reporting during analytical
procedures. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 20, 1: 65–80.
Colbert, J. L. 1989. The effect of experience on auditors’ judgments. Journal of
Accounting Literature 8: 137–149.
Cook, T. D., and D. T. Campbell. 1979. Quasi-Experimentation: Design & Analysis for
Field Settings. Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company.
COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations) 2001. http://www.coso.org.
Cressey, D. R. 1950. The criminal violation of financial trust. American Sociological
Review 15, 6: 738–743.
Cressey, D. R. 1953. Other People’s Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of
Embezzlement. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press.
Dweck, C. S., and E. L. Leggett. 1988. A social-cognitive approach to motivation and
personality. Psychological Review 95, 2: 256–273.

91

Gervey, B. M., C. Chiu, Y. Hong, and C. S. Dweck. 1999. Differential use of person
information in decisions about guilt versus innocence: The role of implicit
theories. Personal and Social Psychology Bulletin 25, 1: 17–27.
Glover, M. G., D. F. Prawitt, J. J. Schultz, and M. F. Zimbleman. 2003. A test of changes
in auditors’ fraud-related planning judgments since the issuance of SAS No. 82.
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 22, 2: 237–251.
Hubbard, L. H. 2002. The importance of ethics. The Internal Auditor 59, 1: 57–59.
IIA (Institute of Internal Auditors) 1985. Statements on Internal Auditing Standards No.
3, Deterrence, Detection, Investigation, and Reporting of Fraud. Altamonte
Springs, FL: IIA.
IIA (Institute of Internal Auditors) 2001. Code of Ethics Rules of Conduct
http://www.theiia.org.
Jerabek, I. 1996. Locus of control and attributional style inventory. Body-Mind
QueenDom, http://www.queendom.com/tests/personality/lc.html.
Leary, M. R. 2001. Introduction to Behavioral Research Methods. Boston: Allyn &
Bacon.
Levy, S. R., S. J. Stroessner, and C. S. Dweck. 1998. Stereotype formation and
endorsement: The role of implicit theories. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 74, 6: 1421–1436.
Libby, R. 1981. Accounting and Human Information Processing: Theory and
Applications. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Libby, R., and B. L. Lewis. 1977. Human information processing research in accounting:
The state of the art. Accounting, Organizations, and Society 2, 3: 245–268.
Loebbecke, J. K, M. M. Eining, and J. J. Willingham. 1989. Auditors' experience with
material irregularities: Frequency, nature, and detectability. Auditing: A Journal
of Practice and Theory 9, 1: 1–28.
McConnell, A. R. 2001. Implicit theories: Consequences for social judgment of
individuals. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 37: 215–227.
Neischwietz, R. J., J. J. Schultz, and M. F. Zimbelman. 2000. Empirical research on
external auditors’ detection of financial statement fraud. Journal of Accounting
Literature 19: 190–246.
Owhoso, V. 2002. Mitigating gender-specific superior ethical sensitivity when assessing
likelihood of fraud risk. Journal of Managerial Issues 14, 3: 360–374.

92

Solomon, I., and M. D. Shields. 1995. Judgment and decision-making research in
auditing. Chapter 6 in Judgment and decision-making research in accounting and
auditing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Steinberg, R. M. 1993. Internal control—integrated framework: A landmark study. The
CPA Journal Online, June, www.luca.com/cpajournal/.
Treadway, J. C., Jr. (Chairman) 1987. Report of The national commission on fraudulent
financial reporting (http://www.coso.org).
Zimbleman, M. F. 1997. The effects of SAS No. 82 on auditors’ attention to fraud risk
factors and audit planning decisions. Journal of Accounting Research 35,
Supplement: 75–97.

93

APPENDIX A: PAPER RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

The eight-page research instrument (paper version) is presented in this appendix.
The instrument was printed on ledger paper (11”×17”) and folded to create a four-page
booklet printed on fronts and backs. The layout of facing pages is shown in Figure 11
below and the actual content of the pages is presented on the following eight pages.
For three reasons, the research instrument completed by respondents may be
different from the one presented in this appendix: (1) there are three versions related to
the experimental manipulation of the variable CUE; (2) some versions were electronic
instead of paper; and (3) the order of questions was randomized. These three variations
are discussed in detail in Appendix B. In the version presented here, the questions are
ordered so that the responses of interest are listed first and distracters follow.

Figure 11. Layout of paper research instrument
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INTERNAL AUDIT
PLANNING DECISIONS
The goal of this dissertation project is to develop an understanding of how an internal auditor's
planning judgments and decisions can impact the outcome of an audit. Because you practice
internal auditing, your expertise is a necessary element for furthering the understanding of how
audits are conducted, which may be helpful in standard setting and to improve training and
practice.
The responses from this questionnaire will be presented in summary form only. You are not
required to provide your name or other identifying information on this questionnaire. If you wish,
you may request the results of this study by emailing swatson@lsu.edu.
After reading and agreeing to the consent infromatino below, you will be walked through six
tasks (1, 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, and 3) in which your opinions and professional judgment should
influence your responses. There are no "right" answers. Thanks you for your participation in this
research project.

CONSENT
By completing this questionnaire, you have agreed to participate in research regarding internal
audit planning decisions. This research project has been approved by the Louisiana State
University Human Subjects Committee. Before continuing on to the questionnaire, it is important
for you to understand the following:
1.The procedure only involves completing a questionnaire.
2.You will not face any significant discomforts or stresses. There is no risk to participating.
3.The results of your participation are confidential and will not be released in any
individually identifiable form. Questionnaire contains no identifying information.
4.The investigator, Stephanie Watson, will answer any further question about the research if
you wish (see contact information below).
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary, and you may choose not to participate
by not returning a completed questionnaire. Your questionnaire will not contain any identifying
information that will link your responses to you; therefore, once your questionnaire has been
returned, it cannot be removed from the study at your request. To preserve anonymity, you do not
need to sign and return this consent form.

STEPHANIE F. WATSON
Doctoral Candidate
LSU Department of Accounting
3101 CEBA
Baton Rouge LA 70803
Phone: (225) 578-6206
email: swatso1@lsu.edu
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SECTION 1: CONTROL OVER OUTCOMES
TASK 1:
Ten statements are presented below regarding the control people have over outcomes in their lives. Indicate
the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the ten statements by marking the appropriate
circle.
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

A person’s integrity is something very
basic about him/her, and it cannot be
changed much.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{

Whether a person is honest and candid or
not is deeply ingrained in his/her
personality and cannot be changed much.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{

There is not much that can be done to
change a person’s integrity traits such as
whether s/he is self-serving or law-abiding
or has integrity, honesty, or diligence.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{

If a person sets realistic goals, s/he can
succeed no matter what.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{

Professional success is mostly a result of
social and economic backgrounds, which
diminish a person’s ability to affect his/her
success significantly through effort.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{

How a person behaves is a changeable
characteristic; behavior patterns can be
altered if a person wants them to change.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{

Without timing, hard work is useless;
being at the right place at the right time is
essential for achieving goals in life.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{

A person gets promoted because the boss
likes him/her personally, not because of
the quality or quantity of work performed.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{

Chance has nothing to do with being
successful; a person is in control of the
level of success s/he achieves.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{

Whatever plans a person makes, there is
always something that will interfere with
them; there isn’t much a person can do to
ensure success.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{
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SECTION 2: INTERNAL AUDIT NARRATIVE AND TASKS
You are an internal auditor for TransportNation, Inc., a transportation company with several divisions
including charter airlines, taxi services, and a national fleet of moving vans. You have recently been
assigned to the team that will audit maintenance expenses for the Chess Cab division of TransportNation.
This audit is still in the planning stage. An excerpt from the planning memorandum is provided below,
which you should read before proceeding to the tasks in this section. You may refer back to this
memorandum while completing the tasks.
Audit Planning Memorandum (excerpt)
TransportNation, Inc.
Per our master audit plan, maintenance expenses of Chess Cab are audited on an annual basis,
budgeting more audit effort in even-numbered years. Therefore, the 2002 audit of these
expenses has budgeted 128 audit hours (two auditors for eight days) to conduct the audit, which
will begin a week from Monday. The audit program should include attention to the items
discussed below.
Key Employees
The key employees that should be interviewed are Terry Alexander, CEO of TransportNation,
Chris Conaway, Director of Chess Cab, and Shawn Whealor, Mechanic Supervisor.
Maintenance Expenses Relative to
Sales

Percent of
Sales

Maintenance Expenses
During the course of this audit, pay
careful attention to the recent reduction
of maintenance expenses as depicted in
the figure to the right. In April 2000, Terry
Alexander replaced the director of Chess
Cab with the specific directive to reduce
these costs. As incentive, the new
director’s bonus in the first five years is
tied to a reduction of these costs.

30
20

19.2

20.7

18.3

15.4

11.1

10
0
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Year

Client Relationships
Chris Conaway, Director of Chess Cab, was hired in April 2000 and was first involved in an audit
of maintenance and insurance expenses in July 2000. During the first audit, Conaway was
cooperative and enthusiastic about effecting changes suggested by the internal auditors.
However, the audit team in 2001 found Conaway distant and detached from the audit process.
During a walk-through of the garage, Shawn Whealor, Mechanic Supervisor, said that Conaway
was distressed about some charitable work. Further investigation revealed that Conaway had
been asked to resign from the DiPalma Children’s Home Fund-Raising Committee because
Conaway was often late to or didn't show up at all for fund-raising drives and meetings and
because Conaway intentionally misled contributors about the number of children's beds that
were available in an effort to boost contributions.
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TASK 2A: FEASIBILITY OF EXPLANATIONS
In the planning memo excerpt you read, Chess Cab’s maintenance expenses to sales ratio is decreasing.
Using your professional judgment, respond to the following seven questions regarding the feasibility of
explanations for this decrease. Indicate your response by marking one circle; the farther you mark to the
right, the more feasible you believe the explanation to be.
1.

How feasible is it that the decrease in maintenance expenses relative to sales was the result of
fraudulent activities on the part of Chris Conaway?
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
0%

2.

Feasibility

100%

How feasible is it that the decrease in maintenance expenses relative to sales was the result of
fraudulent activities on the part of Terry Alexander?
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
0%

3.

Feasibility

100%

How feasible is it that Chris Conaway implemented new policies and procedures that led to the decrease
in maintenance expenses relative to sales?
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
0%

4.

100%

How feasible is it that Terry Alexander or another member of TransportNation’s corporate management
implemented new policies and procedures that led to the decrease in maintenance expenses relative to
sales?
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
0%

5.

Feasibility

Feasibility

100%

How feasible is it that the decrease in maintenance expenses relative to sales is the result of an
unintentional misstatement in Chess Cab’s accounting records?
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
0%

6.

Feasibility

100%

How feasible is it that the decrease in maintenance expenses relative to sales is the result of an
unintentional misstatement in TransportNation’s accounting records?
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
0%

7.

Feasibility

100%

How feasible is it that factors in the external environment—those beyond the control of management—
led to the decrease in maintenance expenses relative to sales?
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
0%

Feasibility
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100%

TASK 2B: LIKELIHOOD OF EXPLANATORY FACTORS
In the narrative you read, Chess Cab’s maintenance expenses to sales ratio is decreasing. The change could
be driven by either a single or a combination of four factors:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Intentional Manipulation such as vandalism, theft, and deceit.
Internal Environment such as procedures and policies.
External Environment such as weather, declining economy, and war.
Misstatement such as unintentional error, transposed numbers, and misinterpretation.

In the table to the right, indicate the likelihood that the
reduction in maintenance expenses relative to sales happened
as a result of these four explanatory factors by distributing
100 points among the four factors. The largest number of
points assigned to a factor will indicate that the factor is the
most likely cause of the decrease. When the total equals 100,
continue to Task 2C.

Factor

Points

Intentional Manipulation
Internal Environment
External Environment
Misstatement
Total

100

TASK 2C: PERSONAL QUALITIES
Six statements are presented below regarding the personal characteristics of Chris Conaway, Director of
Chess Cabs. Indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the ten statements by marking
the appropriate circle.
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Chris Conaway seems to have
integrity.

Chris Conaway seems candid.

Chris Conaway seems responsible.

Chris Conaway seems self-serving.

Chris Conaway seems well-informed.

Chris Conaway seems unintelligent.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

{

{

{

{

{

{

100

TASK 2D: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
As an internal auditor, you gather the information you need to plan the audit. In the spaces below, list up to
six additional pieces of information (not provided in the planning materials) that you would like to have
before finalizing the maintenance expense audit program for Chess Cab. Your response may be in the form
of a question or statement.

one

two

three

four

five

six
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SECTION 3: INFORMATION ABOUT YOU
TASK 3
Please provide some information about yourself. All data collected in this research project are confidential.
The results of this study will be presented in summary form; no individual information will be reported.
1.

Do you hold any professional certifications? Mark all that apply:
 CIA
CPA

2.

 CFE
 CFA

 CMA
 CISA

 Other, specify ____________________________________
 I do not hold a professional certification.

Please list the degrees you hold and subject area (e.g., B.S. in Accounting):
_________________________________________________________________________________

3.

What is your current job title?
_________________________________________________________________________________

4.

How many years of experience do you have in auditing?
_______ years _______ months

5.

For what portion of your experience as an auditor were you an internal auditor?
_______ years _______ months

6.

About how long did it take you to complete this questionnaire?
_______ minutes

7.

What is your level of experience with the audit of expenses (not necessarily vehicle maintenance
expenses) as described in the tasks?
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Low

8.

Experience

High

Please use the space below to comment on any aspect of this questionnaire.

Place your completed questionnaire in the postage-paid reply envelope and drop it in the mail.
Thank you for your participation!
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APPENDIX B: RESEARCH INSTRUMENT VARIATIONS

There are multiple versions of the research instrument presented in Appendix A
that result from three types of variations: (1) there are three versions related to the
experimental manipulation of the variable CUE; (2) some versions were electronic
instead of paper; and (3) the order of questions was randomized.
B.1. Experimental Manipulation Variations

The narrative presented in the research instrument contains an integrity cue under
the heading “Client Relationships.” There are three levels of integrity in this study, and
each respondent’s version contained only one level. The variations in the text used to
represent this cue are presented in Table 22. Each cue contained the lead-in shown in
panel A, but depending on the level of the manipulated variable, the final statements
(integrity cue) were different.
B.2. Electronic Research Instruments

Many of the responses obtained for this research project were collected using
electronic research instruments and email rather than mailing and returning a tradition
paper instrument shown in Appendix A. The electronic instrument was created in
Microsoft Excel and contained macros and buttons that emulate reading through the
actual eight-page paper instrument. Notable differences are discussed below.
First, the responses in the electronic instrument are made by clicking and typing
as opposed to writing. Second, the ability of the respondent to return to a task (i.e.,
change answers in a completed task) is removed in the electronic instrument. However,
the respondents can return to the narrative in both the paper and electronic instruments.
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Table 22. Narrative versions
Panel A: Lead-in to integrity cue
Chris Conaway, Director of Chess Cab, was hired in April 2000 and
was first involved in an audit of maintenance and insurance expenses in
July 2000. During the first audit, Conaway was cooperative and
enthusiastic about effecting changes suggested by the internal auditors.
However, the audit team in 2001 found Conaway distant and detached
from the audit process. During a walk-through of the garage, Shawn
Whealor, Mechanic Supervisor, said that Conaway was distressed about
some charitable work.
Panel B: Manipulated integrity cue
CUE
Narrative text
Low
Further investigation revealed that Conaway had been asked to resign
Integrity
from the DiPalma Children’s Home Fund-Raising Committee because
Conaway was often late to or didn't show up at all for fund-raising
drives and meetings and because Conaway intentionally misled
contributors about the number of children's beds that were available in
an effort to boost contributions.

Medium
Integrity

Further investigation revealed that Conaway had been asked to resign
from the DiPalma Children’s Home Fund-Raising Committee because
Conaway was often late to or didn't show up at all for fund-raising
drives and meetings.

High
Integrity

Further investigation revealed that Conaway lost a large contributor to
the DiPalma Children’s Home when the contributor asked what
percentage of the funds raised went to overhead and Conaway told him
the truth.

Finally, there were 12 pages in the electronic instruments as opposed to eight in the paper
instruments. Table 23 describes the mapping between the pages of the two instrument
media.
B.3. Randomization of Question Order

In an attempt to avoid the effects that order of questions might have on responses,
the questions in each task were randomized. In the electronic instruments, the macros that
controlled movement from page to page also randomized the questions for each
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Table 23. Comparison of paper and electronic instruments
Paper
Electronic
Electronic Instrument
Instrument
Instrument
Screen Shot

1. Cover

1. Cover

Figure 12

2. Instructions, Consent,
and Researcher Contact a

2. Instructions

Figure 13

3. Consent

Figure 14

4. Researcher Contact

Figure 15

3. Section 1: Task 1

5. Section 1: Task 1

Figure 16

4. Section 2: Narrative

6. Section 2: Narrative

Figure 17

5. Section 2: Task 2A

7. Section 2: Task 2A

Figure 18

6. Section 2:
Task 2B and Task 2C b

8. Section 2: Task 2B

Figure 19

9. Section 2: Task 2C

Figure 20

7. Section 2: Task 2D

10. Section 2: Task 2D

Figure 21

8. Section 3: Task 3
and Return Instructions c

11. Section 3: Task 3

Figure 22

12. Return Instructions

Figure 23

a

The instructions, consent, and researcher contact information were split into three pages in the
electronic version. The first two were separated to ensure that the researcher gave consent separate from
understanding the instructions. The respondents could view the researcher contact information at any
time during completion of the survey while other pages were hidden as the respondent completed
reading them.

b

Tasks 2B and 2C are physically short and were presented on one page on the paper instrument, but were
separated on the electronic instrument.

c

Return instructions for the instrument were printed in a box at the bottom of the last page of the paper
instrument which contained Task 3. In the electronic version, after Task 3 is completed, the return
instructions are presented on a separate page.

respondent. On the paper instruments, an attempt was made to construct each instrument
separately so questions could be presented in random order. However, some instruments
and tasks were photocopied resulting in some respondents receiving the same order of
questions. Therefore, the effect of the order of questions on responses was examined, and
no effect was found; see section 4.6.
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Figure 12. Electronic instrument screen shot: Cover

Figure 13. Electronic instrument screen shot: Instructions
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Figure 14. Electronic instrument screen shot: Consent

Figure 15. Electronic instrument screen shot: Researcher contact
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Figure 16. Electronic instrument screen shot: Section 1, Task 1
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Figure 17. Electronic instrument screen shot: Section 2, Narrative
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Figure 18. Electronic instrument screen shot: Section 2, Task 2A
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Figure 19. Electronic instrument screen shot: Section 2, Task 2B

Figure 20. Electronic instrument screen shot: Section 2, Task 2C
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Figure 21. Electronic instrument screen shot: Section 2, Task 2D
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Figure 22. Electronic instrument screen shot: Section 3, Task 3
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Figure 23. Electronic instrument screen shot: Return instructions
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